The Future of Soft Power and International Education

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The Future of Soft Power and International Education

Bryan McAllister-Grande, Brandeis University

Jed Willard, Harvard University

David Comp, University of Chicago
The Forgotten Internationalists

Research on the history of international education & public diplomacy (post-WWII period)

NAFSA annual conference
May 27, 2008
Bryan McAllister-Grande, Brandeis University
International Education 1945 - 1970

Prior Research

• Defined by Cold War “prism”
• Research on single components (history of study abroad, Fulbright program, IIE, NAFSA, intl. students enrollments, CIEE)
• IE is barely mentioned in most histories of American education
• Little comparative, cross-regional study (exception: de Wit, 2002 compared US and Europe)

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• In contrast: explosion of research in public/cultural diplomacy; “American knowledge and global power” (Engerman, 2007)
• Influence of Mestenhauser (1998; 2002) and Vestal (1994) in thinking about IE as a “system” and part of a “mega-goal”
Research Questions – history of ideas

- Did internationalization as an *idea/strategy* exist in the post-WWII period?
- If so, how was it defined, conceptualized, and communicated among scholars/experts?
- How did *ideas* of internationalization overlap with *ideas* of public diplomacy?
Idea 1: Global knowledge for all students

- Curriculum reforms in 1940s and 50s
- Diversified study abroad options
- Area studies infused into general curriculum
- Two main learning outcomes: deep knowledge of at least one culture; general knowledge of cultural concepts and interaction
- International students offer a “model” of world affairs in and out of the classroom (Wilson 1956)
- Both a private good and a public good...internationalization of the curriculum intimately tied to US international relations
Idea 2: Universities as central players in educational and human development

• Morrill Committee outlines a comprehensive plan for university internationalization in fostering human understanding
• Compliments new international offices and VPs of international affairs
• Government contracts for educational development
• Fulbright-Hays Act, Peace Corp, USAID
• Birth of NGO Education and World Affairs (1962-early 70s)
• Internationalization of all aspects of the university key to transforming education
Morrill Report (1961)

“Lifting of sights that will transcend the traditionally domestic and Western orientation of scholarship and training in universities and colleges, and the limited aims of ‘technical assistance’ and ‘national defense’ in government”
Idea 3: A comprehensive international education plan (Frankel, 1965; 66)

• Shades of globalization: world societies now intricately linked through economic and political systems
• Necessary to do the same kind of integration with educational systems through major exchanges of intellectuals, citizens and youth
• Shades of the internet: “The US should take a leading role in creating an international knowledge bank...information retrieval systems and computerized networks for the communication of knowledge”
• Establish a Center for Educational Cooperation (CEC) and a team of educational ambassadors abroad
• International Education as a major Domestic and Foreign Policy Goal for the US
International Education Act of 1966

“...that ideas, not armaments, will shape our last prospects for peace; that the conduct of our foreign policy will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms; that the knowledge of our citizens is the one treasure which grows only when it is shared” ~ LBJ at the Smithsonian, 1965
Themes for today

• Thinking of international education as a system of academic and non-academic components and knowledge
• Mutually-beneficial partnerships
• Connection to civil society development
Research Needs

• Primary source research: archival work of university histories, foundation histories, NGOs, government programs
• Studies which examine the long-term impact of exchange programs on receiving/host individuals and receiving/host societies
• Oral histories: particularly urgency because many key players are long retired
• Need to produce research which is linked to traditional disciplines and has academic weight: link history of IE to broader US, educational and comparative histories
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education
In International Relations

David Comp
Senior Adviser for International Initiatives in The College
The University of Chicago
Education is a slow-moving but powerful force. It may not be fast enough or strong enough to save us from catastrophe, but it is the strongest force available for that purpose and in its proper place, therefore, is not at the periphery, but at the center of international relations.

- J. William Fulbright
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power
Co-Chairs ~ Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

- 1999 Clinton Administration ended funding for the United States Information Agency (USIA) and merged operations into the United States Department of State.

- 1999 saw creation of new Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy in Department of State.

- Overall spending on information and overall spending on information and educational and cultural affairs rebounded in 2001 under the Bush administration. Spending levels, however, remain well below that of the USIA budgets of the early 1990’s

- Current annual public diplomacy spending at approximately $1.5 billion.
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power
Co-Chairs ~ Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Citations from CSIS Report:

• CSIS Signature Initiative ~ Invest in Educational Exchanges
  An effective public diplomacy approach must include exchanges of ideas, peoples, and information through educational and cultural exchanges = citizen diplomacy.

• The American public constitutes the United States’ greatest public diplomacy assets, particularly young people who increasingly study, work, volunteer, and travel overseas.
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

Figure 6. Public Diplomacy Spending, 1994–2008

*Request

Note: IIP = International Information Programs; other = (principally) National Endowment for Democracy, East-West Center, Asia Foundation, and North-South Center.
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

FY 2009, Presidential budget includes a $522 million request for the educational and cultural exchange programs of the U.S. Department of State and $110 million for the Department of Education’s International Education and Foreign Languages Studies (IEFLS) programs which include Title VI and the Fulbright Hays programs.

The amount proposed for educational and cultural exchange programs represents a $21 million increase over 2008 levels. The administration also requests a slight increase for the Title VI and Fulbright-Hays programs. An additional $24 million in funding is proposed for the Advancing America through Foreign Language Partnerships program, which is part of the President’s National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) under the Department of Education.

According to budget documents from the Department of State, the FY 2009 request includes: $303 million for academic programs, $162 million for professional and cultural exchanges, $55 million for exchanges support, and $3 million for program and performance. The report justifies the funding for these programs, stating "ECA programs foster engagement and encourage dialogue with citizens around the world, particularly with key influencers such as clerics, educators, journalists, women, and youth."

http://www.nafsa.org/public_policy.sec/president_bush_announces_2
NAFSA’s Recent Activities in this Area

2008 conference

- Plenary Panel moderated by Judy Woodruff entitled “Examining Public Diplomacy and its Effects” Wednesday the 28th from 10am-noon
- Session entitled “Election ’08: Presidential Candidates’ Advisers Speak on U.S. Leadership and Engagement
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Ursula Oaks, 202.737.3699 ext. 253
For Release: Jul 22, 2005
Successful Public Diplomacy Strategy Must Include Central Role for Educational, Cultural Exchanges

As the U.S. Senate holds the confirmation hearing of Karen Hughes today for the key State Department post of undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, repairing America’s image abroad and the challenges of the global war for hearts and minds continue to be issues of critical importance to the country. Amid questions about libraries, America’s "brand," and broadcasting stations abroad, the debate about the future of U.S. public diplomacy must include serious consideration of what new strategic direction will be needed to achieve what is at the core of this critical mission: to establish strong, meaningful ties between the American people and the rest of the world. There is no better or more proven tool for this important task than educational, professional, and cultural exchanges.

Since World War II, generations of foreign policy leaders have acknowledged the central importance of educational and cultural exchanges to winning friends for the United States. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted this week that such exchanges are "the way that we get the face of America to others and that we get others to know us." Recent commission reports, including that of the 9/11 Commission, have emphasized the need to include educational and cultural exchanges as an integral component of a strategy to win the war on terrorism.

http://www.nafsa.org/press_releases.sec/press_releases.pg/successful_public_diplomacy
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

NAFSA’s Recent Activities in this Area (Continued)

**Wednesday, November 16, 2005 — 2:00-3:00 p.m.**

**Featuring Distinguished Panelists**

- Ambassador Cresencio Arcos, Director of International Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
- The Honorable Jim Kolbe, United States Congressman (R-AZ)
- Sanford J. Ungar, President, Goucher College

**Hosted by**
James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, The Heritage Foundation

**Moderated by**
Marlene M. Johnson, Executive Director and CEO, NAFSA: Association of International Educators

**Background**
Today the contributions of international education and exchange to the national interest are virtually unquestioned. High-level government officials frequently cite exchanges as one of the most effective ways of winning friends in an increasingly volatile and unpredictable world. Yet the United States lacks an effective policy for utilizing this indispensable tool. In this policy vacuum, increasing numbers of foreign students and researchers are pursuing their educations and careers elsewhere, only a minuscule percentage of American college students ever study abroad or graduate with familiarity with a foreign language or region, and numerous barriers impede the exchange experience. Robust international educational and cultural exchanges must be a central part of a successful public diplomacy strategy. Four experts will examine this critical issue for U.S. leadership, competitiveness, and security.

**Location**
The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, D.C. 20002
NAFSA’s future role in soft power/cultural diplomacy efforts:

• Continuation of special seminars (Heritage Foundation Seminar) specifically focused on this topic
• Continued collaboration with a variety of stakeholders
• Engage university presidents and other leaders in this area
• Continued advocacy efforts with a variety of policy makers and government officials
• Conference committee could focus on selecting relevant sessions at annual conference
• NAFSA staff and member leadership support for more formalized focus/organization on soft power/cultural diplomacy efforts.
  – Establish a task force, subcommittee or member interest group (MIG)
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power
Co-Chairs ~ Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Recommendations from CSIS Report:

• Expand successful exchange and education programs
  – Call for Congress to double this appropriation, with greater emphasis placed on support for students and professionals in medical, engineering, computer sciences and the education field.

• Expand Dept. of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program

• Launch U.S.-China and U.S.-India Educational Funds
  – Propose a ten-year special allocation of new funds administered through the Fulbright Program.

• Expand Middle East language competencies

• Draw on America’s cultural advantages
  – America’s immigrant communities provide rich source of international understanding within our borders.

• Many Americans have connections to other parts of the world, are fluent in their ancestral language, and could serve as citizen diplomats abroad.
Making for a More Positive Future
The Role of International Education In International Relations

Resources Consulted/Cited

CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America (2007)
Co-Chairs ~ Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

http://www.clingenda...public-diplomacy.pdf
Discussion Questions

Is IE and soft power a de facto dysfunctional relationship? IE seems to imply a respect for diversity and diversification of meaning, while “soft power” seems to imply force of will. Is there really room for both in a global world?
Discussion Questions

How does the Lincoln/Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act fit in with future interpretations of soft power?
Discussion Questions

How does globalization and transnational flows of people and ideas affect contemporary and future interpretations of “soft power”? Although nation-states are certainly not defunct, are there now other avenues of “soft power” that might be pursued? (perhaps organized terrorism networks is in fact a discouraging example)
Discussion Questions

One might argue that is currently a “race for the world’s poor” going on as universities around the world rush to infuse their campuses, ideals and faculties into developing countries (the branch campus phenomenon, and even the recent news that India would be investing millions of dollars in education in Africa!). How do you see this race playing out?
Discussion Questions

What is the role of major new regional entities like the EU and the African Union – and to a lesser extent the new regional education “hubs” like the knowledge cities in Dubai, Qatar, and Singapore – in setting policies and practices for soft power?
The Future of Soft Power and International Education

Session Outline:

I  Introduction – interpretations of IE/public diplomacy (Jed) 10 min
II Post-WWII history (Bryan) 10-12 min
III Current state (Jed) 10-12 min
IV Future – leading comments/key themes (David) 10-12 min
V Moderated Discussion of “Future” based on David’s comments 15 min
VI Final Q&A on all parts of the session 5 min

I  Introduction

1. Greetings. More interest in soft power this year than last year, and more last year than before. Real change not just at NAFSA but in the world at large.

2. Definitions of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
   a. Soft power coined by Harvard professor Joe Nye in the early 70s
   b. Coercion, bribery, attraction (attraction via culture, values, legacy)
   c. Public Diplomacy is a tactic
      i. Purposeful pursuit of soft power via communication with the publics of other nations
      ii. Can include exchanges but also involves direct and indirect communication via media, the explanation of foreign policy, and the correction of misinformation
      iii. Important: PD is not one nation speaking to the public – many actors involved, each with agenda – common misconception, especially in America

3. Where does IE fit in?
   a. Lots of disputes over what PD tactics work best, resources, etc.
b. Only agreement is that international exchange is the single best practice, especially over the long term, i.e. everyone from DOS, DOD, the private sector agrees on one thing = us

4. Format and Introductions

a. This session will take you through the past, present, and future of IE’s involvement in public diplomacy and soft power concerns

b. Bryan McAllister-Grande of Brandeis = past. Bryan is interested in the history of IE, and is researching post-WWII internationalization strategies

c. Jed = present. Currently researching contemporary PD debates at Harvard; also co-founder of PD-focused work-abroad organization, LanguageCorps

d. David Comp of UC = future. David is on the board of TLS KC and is particularly interested in IE in the inter-war years and early cold ear years

e. Following the three visitations it's your turn – leave enough time for Q&A, invite you to leave your cards with us to participate in ongoing conversations and research regarding IE's role in SP and PD concerns

5. Throughout session, three questions to keep in mind:

a. Should IE professionals pay attention to PD as we practice our craft?

b. If so, how can we incorporate PD concerns into our practice?

c. If we incorporate PD concerns, will this change the nature of the way we communicate and cooperate with our academic, administration, government, and private partners?
II History Presentation Outline

1. The history of U.S. international education is generally defined on Cold War terms
   b. Expansion and “euphoria” for international education
   c. First serious public-private partnerships to accomplish mutual goals
   d. International education/internationalization thought of as a system of connected academic, diplomatic, and other non-academic “parts”
   e. Foundations and NGOs take major roles
   f. Links between knowledge and power, rise of the social sciences in American higher education, widespread belief in universalism – that whole societies could be influenced, shaped, and changed by personal and behavioral interaction

2. Definition of the research question
   a. Did “internationalization” as an idea/strategy exist in the post-WWII period? If so, how was it defined, conceptualized, and communicated among scholars/experts? How did ideas of internationalization overlap with ideas of public diplomacy/cultural diplomacy?

3. “Unknown milestones”
   a. much of the literature written about internationalization in the post WWII period is unknown
   b. There is really no systematic effort to connect the history of IE with scholarly articles written in other fields - which have A LOT to say about the history of IE!

4. “Unknown milestones” and debates of the post-WWII period
   a. Internationalization of the curriculum/campus – first offices of international affairs/programs, area studies, introduction of new knowledge, integration of international students, etc.
   b. Public/citizen-based diplomacy efforts in government (call out specific quotes from Coombs, Frankel)
   c. International educational development programs
   d. Center for Educational Cooperation
   e. Education and World Affairs (EWA) organization
   g. Presidential Task Force (1962 – 1965)
   h. Culmination of all of this - International Education Act of 1966

5. What does this history mean for us today?
   a. While certainly the history of IE was often defined in narrow national security terms, or conversely in quite idealized notions of “world peace and understanding,” it also provided the sense of team work and space for
bold, ambitious theories of internationalization, ones based on mutually-beneficial educational partnerships – a kind of “education revolution”
b. Its mixing of education and politics raised some critical questions – should there be one single “voice” for international education? Where should the final control and coordination lay? Where should education fit with foreign aid programs? Was, ironically, a more “global” definition of internationalization missing, and does this definition exist today?
c. Ultimately, efforts to unify the international studies/diplomacy community basically didn’t work and IEA was never funded. What kind of lessons does this have for us today?
d. Promise for a future when internationalization (with government support) is better linked to global civil society development….must be seen as a system for this to happen. Both a public good and a private good, not just a private good.
III  Current State

1. Who does Public Diplomacy today?
   a. Those of you following the debates in congress and the media can answer this: it’s the military – reach, manpower, money
   b. See themselves as the tip of the spear with presence on the ground worldwide far exceeding that of IE or DOS, and increasingly take diplomatic role more seriously – with some consequences
   c. Legally, though, PD is owned by DOS – in my opinion should be.
      i. Avoid too much detail but... USIA gone, PDPA+BBG, IE under PDPA, which as a whole is underfunded and understaffed
      ii. In practice who does IE? We do, often in concert with DOS
   d. Everyone – countless interviews with diplomats and military officers – agrees IE is most important and in long run most effective PD – no contradictions, sine qua non

2. In practice, how do we as IE practitioners incorporate public diplomacy concerns?
   a. General consensus that exchanges of older persons is better, and bringing better than sending (order) – importance of experiencing reality of host nation, activities of different groups, propensity to integrate
   c. Works for outbound, too: careful pre-departure training and programming
   d. Another key = alumni relations, long term effort means real PD benefit happens later – also chance to integrate with development office
   e. Last: framing of IE practice with academics and administration

2. If we don't do these things, why not?
   a. Mostly leave as open question for discussion, but one story
   b. Longtime USIA/Amb: why not more focus? A: time; visas (“easy”). Converting from student to worker – pale: no return
IV Future

   Co-Chairs ~ Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
   a. 1999 Clinton Administration ended funding for the United States Information Agency (USIA) and merged operations into the United States Department of State.
   b. 1999 saw creation of new Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy in Department of State.
   c. Overall spending on information and educational and cultural affairs rebounded in 2001 under the Bush administration. Spending levels, however, remain well below that of the USIA budgets of the early 1990’s
d. Current annual public diplomacy spending at approximately $1.5 billion.

2. Interesting citations from CSIS report:
a. Invest in educational exchanges
   i. An effective public diplomacy approach must include exchanges of ideas, peoples, and information through educational and cultural exchanges = citizen diplomacy.
   ii. The American public constitutes the United States’ greatest public diplomacy assets, particularly young people who increasingly study, work, volunteer, and travel overseas.

3. Quick Financial overview

   a. FY 2009, Presidential budget includes a $522 million request for the educational and cultural exchange programs of the U.S. Department of State and $110 million for the Department of Education’s International Education and Foreign Languages Studies (IEFLS) programs which include Title VI and the Fulbright Hays programs.

   b. The amount proposed for educational and cultural exchange programs represents a $21 million increase over 2008 levels. The administration also requests a slight increase for the Title VI and Fulbright-Hays programs. An additional $24 million in funding is proposed for the Advancing America through Foreign Language Partnerships program, which is part of the President’s National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) under the Department of Education.

   c. FY 2009 request includes: $303 million for academic programs, $162 million for professional and cultural exchanges, $55 million for exchanges support, and $3 million for program and performance.

4. NAFSA’s Recent Activities in this Area
a. 2008 conference
   i. Plenary Panel moderated by Judy Woodruff entitled “Examining Public Diplomacy and its Effects” Wednesday the 28th from 10am-noon
   ii. Session entitled “Election ’08: Presidential Candidates’ Advisers Speak on U.S. Leadership and Engagement
b. Press announcements to membership and other stakeholders
   i. Confirmation hearings for Karen Hughes as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy
c. Hosting/Sponsoring panel sessions (non conference) on Cultural/Citizen Diplomacy such as the 2005 panel hosted by the Heritage Foundation.

5. NAFSA’s future role in soft power/cultural diplomacy efforts:
   a. Continuation of special seminars (Heritage Foundation Seminar) specifically focused on this topic
   b. Continued collaboration with a variety of stakeholders
   c. Engage university presidents and other leaders in this area
   d. Continued advocacy efforts with a variety of policy makers and government officials
   e. Conference committee could focus on selecting relevant sessions at annual conference
   f. NAFSA staff and member leadership support for more formalized focus/organization on soft power/cultural diplomacy efforts.
   g. Establish a task force, subcommittee or member interest group (MIG)

6. Recommendations from CSIS Report:
   a. Expand successful exchange and education programs
   b. Call for Congress to double this appropriation, with greater emphasis placed on support for students and professionals in medical, engineering, computer sciences and the education field.
   c. Expand Dept. of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program
   d. Launch U.S.-China and U.S.-India Educational Funds
   e. Propose a ten-year special allocation of new funds administered through the Fulbright Program.
   f. Expand Middle East language competencies
   g. Draw on America’s cultural advantages
   h. America’s immigrant communities provide rich source of international understanding within our borders.
   i. Many Americans have connections to other parts of the world, are fluent in their ancestral language, and could serve as citizen diplomats abroad.
V Moderated Discussion of “Future” based on David’s comments – “bank” of questions in case audience doesn’t chime in

1. How does globalization and transnational flows of people and ideas affect contemporary and future interpretations of “soft power”? Although nation-states are certainly not defunct, are there now other avenues of “soft power” that might be pursued? (perhaps organized terrorism networks is in fact a discouraging example)

2. What will be the future relationship between academia and the government, given the commercialization of education and the rise of for-profit providers?

3. How does the Lincoln/Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act fit in with future interpretations of soft power?

4. Is IE and soft power a de facto dysfunctional relationship? IE seems to imply a respect for diversity and diversification of meaning, while “soft power” seems to imply force of will. Is there really room for both in a global world?

5. One might argue that is currently a “race for the world’s poor” going on as universities around the world rush to infuse their campuses, ideals and faculties into developing countries (the branch campus phenomenon, and even the recent news that India would be investing millions of dollars in education in Africa!). How do you see this race playing out?

6. What is the role of major new regional entities like the EU and the African Union – and to a lesser extent the new regional education “hubs” like the knowledge cities in Dubai, Qatar, and Singapore – in setting policies and practices for soft power?

Bryan McAllister-Grande  
M.Ed. ‘06, Harvard Graduate School of Education  
Draft article/please ask before citing at bgrande@brandeis.edu  
February 19, 2008

Note: This article is very much a “work-in-progress.”  
Comments and suggestions welcome!

As the study of the internationalization of U.S. higher education becomes increasingly sophisticated, researchers have concentrated on the phenomenon’s definition, strategies, and rationales, while few have explored its historical development (de Wit, 2002). The general perception seems to be that internationalization is a relatively new concept in U.S. higher education; as Mestenhauser has argued, most educators and policy makers do not possess a systematic view of the field’s historical roots and social psychology (1998; 2002; 2007). Perhaps this observation is due, in part, to the subject’s complexity as a “field” with no consistent methodology, definition or research tradition (Kehm and Teichler, 2007). Although research has exploded as of late, it remains as multidimensional as ever, encompassing local, national and international policies as well as institutional strategies and intellectual approaches. From a historical perspective, this complexity means the researcher must pay attention to multiple areas of scholarship, from the history of higher education to that of governmental policy. While these areas are highly aligned in some countries, in the U.S. there has been little cohesive connection (de Wit, 2002).

This article, then, is an attempt to “map” the inter-field definitions and theories of international education and internationalization from the U.S. perspective, focusing on the post-World War II (WWII) period. It will incorporate a relational framework - building upon the work of Mestenhauser (1998; 2002), Vestal (1994), Sylvester (2003) and others. The article and accompanying “map” will attempt to answer a few questions. First, did the idea of “internationalization” exist in the post-WWII era? If so, how was it defined, conceptualized and communicated? Finally, what do these conceptualizations tell us about the time period, and how do they relate to the present ideas of internationalization?
Definitions of Internationalization and International Education

Myriad researchers have explored the relationship between “international education” and its related terms, among them “internationalization,” “global education,” “intercultural education,” “transnational education,” as well as comparative education and international higher education. This article will explore these definitions vis-à-vis the texts and documents from the time period; the terms “global citizen,” “world citizen,” and “international civil servant” will also be analyzed. But perhaps an initial overview of these definitions will provide context for the article.

Typically, international education is the umbrella term used to define any set of activities or programs that promote or facilitate the exchange of people and ideas across borders. This was the term preferred by most researchers, educators and policy makers in the post-WWII period, and today as then it is often used interchangeably with internationalization and other terms. It is perhaps distinguished by the focus on specific activities and programs, such as study abroad, international student affairs or overseas educational assistance. It can also encompass comparative education; that is, the comparative study of national education systems.

International Studies was another term used widely in the post-WWII period. It was often used interchangeably with international education; elsewhere, it was meant as the academic, interdisciplinary study of international affairs and systems. Today, it almost exclusively refers to an undergraduate academic major.

Internationalization can be differentiated from international education and international studies by its focus on the process of infusing a new dimension into education rather than on specific products and programs. In higher education it has been defined as “…the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions, or delivery of post-secondary education” (Knight, 2004). As this definition implies, the process can be observed and in-acted on multiple levels: the international (through organizations/agencies such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization); the national (through governmental policies and national non-governmental organizations), the local (via state policies or regional accrediting bodies); the institutional (via university strategies and mission statements); and even at the unit level of departments, disciplines, programs and individuals. What complicates the picture even further is the rise and influence of consortiums, foundations, professional associations and for-profit institutions in the late 20th and early 21st centuries that provided and continue to drive much of the funding and coordination for internationalization. Portions of that history will be chronicled here.

As mentioned above, the history of U.S. higher education development provides a fascinating case study for tracking the development of internationalization as an idea. Unlike some other national systems, there is no direct policy relationship between various educational institutions and the federal government. While the federal government played
an increasingly expansive role in higher education largely beginning in the post-WWII period, it did not explicitly control higher education or internationalization policy (Thelin, 2004; de Wit, 2002). This autonomy and disorganization led to a diverse set of approaches, rationales, programs and structures (de Wit, 2002). It also helped create the space for a collection of non-governmental organizations devoted to international education and internationalization, among them the Institute of International Education (IIE), the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors (NAFSA, now the Association of International Educators); Education and World Affairs (EWA, now defunct); the Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE); and aspects of the American Council on Education (ACE).

This article hopes to be a starting point for discussing these complex relationships between individual institutional goals and national/local policies. The terms international education and internationalization will sometimes be used interchangeably, but the crux of the article will be to examine how internationalization as a process of change was debated and developed in the post-WWII period.

Matrix Mapping and Systems Theory

This article builds mainly upon the work of three contemporary authors. Sylvester (2002; 2003, 2005) provided a survey of the research on international education from 1893 – 1998. His lens was mostly from the viewpoint of K-12 education, although he also covered higher education. In order to provide a usable framework for further research, Sylvester used a matrix mapping technique that positioned definitions of international education within the overlapping themes/characteristics of “education for international understanding,” “education for world citizenship,” “politically sensitive,” and “politically neutral.” The same technique will be used here, again with the purpose of building upon this general framework (with alterations to the categories, to be noted). This article will also build upon and use some of the key texts that Sylvester explored, especially those that applied more specifically to higher education.

Both Mestenhauser (1998, 2002, 2007) and Vestal (1994) consider international education/internationalization as a system, “third-order field,” or “mosaic” rather than a specific discipline. In particular, Mestenhauser advocates that the history of its development be approached using systems theory (Ibid). Systems theory has been used in higher education to better understand institutions as complex organizations or more specifically as “loosely-coupled systems” (Bess & Dee, 2007; Birnbaum, 1988), as well as the decisions of individuals within this system. However, Mestenhauser also uses systems theory at the more macro-level, describing international education as a complex system of academic and non-academic components. He argues that one of the outcomes of the international education system was a “mega-goal” that would seek to reform both
education and foreign diplomatic policy simultaneously (Mestenhauser, 1998, 2002). This article will take a glance at his “mega-goal” argument.

Overall, it seems apt to use a multidimensional mapping approach to provide a broad landscape of this “system” before tackling, for instance, specific institutional histories or cause-and-effect relationships.

**International Education in the Post-WWII Era: Expansion and Euphoria**

The post-WWII period, defined here as approximately 1945 – 1970, is generally considered to be the “birth” of international education as we know it today. Although certainly the exchange of scholars, students and ideas across borders has a long and intricate history, WWII and its aftermath created a whole new set of questions, concerns and initiatives. Mestenhauser calls this time period one of “euphoria,” when most international education programs were created or expanded (1998; 2002). Not coincidentally, this was also a time of an explosion of research into the theories and dimensions of international education throughout the education system (Sylvestre, 2003). Additionally, as Vestal recounts in his landmark *International Education: Its History and Promise for Today* (1994), the post-WWII period also saw the first semi-coordinated effort of government support and coordination for international education. The culmination of this support was the now-forgotten International Education Act of 1966; although it was never funded, the act remains significant both for its historical importance and the range of ideas that have carried over to the modern era.

Based on the few contemporary surveys of the time period, most researchers view the theories and rationales for international education as either based upon national defense/security and/or an idealized notion of world peace. De Wit, for example, argues that the rationale for international education was largely political, driven top-down by the U.S. government, and produced mostly out of fear or desire for dominance as a superpower (2002). Similarly, Altbach calls higher education a “key battlefield” in the Cold War, with the U.S. attempting to influence and gain control over the system largely through international/transnational education projects – a form of what he terms “neo-colonialism,” a war over hearts and minds (2004). Reviewing the history of study abroad programs, Hoffa surmises that – perhaps as a reaction against these very policies or a “softer” version of them – most liberal arts colleges’ international education programs were built upon a rationale of “world peace” through the understanding of other cultures and societies (2007). In both dynamics, U.S. students and scholars overseas were often termed “cultural ambassadors,” and their work overseas had an “us” helping “them” bent.

While the impact of the external political and social environment (namely the Cold War) cannot be ignored, many of these studies still seem to miss a more complex history of international education and internationalization in the post-WWII period, at least at the level of conceptualization if not action. A number of authors and policy-
makers wrote extensively not only about a new world order, but about the introduction of a whole new set of knowledge and ideals into the university curriculum and campus. Others wrote about a transformation of the university system and of a global outlook to education in general. Finally, several government leaders (many of whom were in fact academics) proposed a more focused definition of cultural diplomacy, of what might be called “humanist cultural diplomacy”: educational networks that would ultimately distinguish if not separate some forms of cultural diplomacy from traditional foreign policy.

**Internationalizing the Curriculum and Campus**

Theories of internationalization in the post-WWII period were often tied to the lifeblood of any institution – the curriculum. Led by Harvard, whose 1945 *Report on General Education in a Free Society* served as a model for curriculum reform after the war, many universities reexamined their offerings and introduced entirely new disciplines or interdisciplinary programs. This article will not fully examine those reforms, but the Harvard report – and similar ones from the nation’s elite institutions – certainly led to a reexamination of the aims and purposes of liberal education in the post-WWII era, with the most widespread outcome being the general education “requirements” taken the first and sometimes first two years of a student’s undergraduate degree.

Byrnes and Thompson, writing in *Liberal Education* in 1959, advocated that colleges and universities needed to develop a curriculum that allowed for deep understanding of one or two cultures. They also argued that, simultaneously, students should learn about the general transferability of concepts between cultures. To accomplish these goals, according to Byrnes and Thompson, institutions needed to re-conceptualize and integrate area studies and language programs towards deeper intellectual learning rather technical/vocational training. They further commented:

> The introduction of a whole new body of material into the undergraduate curriculum raises an alarming specter: we may have to pay for our additions by costly amputations of subjects already being taught and (worse) of the people who are teaching them. The coming struggle for the student’s time may be more intense than ever…Yet it is possible in education to kill more than one bird with one stone. If the teaching profession accepts the premise that a liberal arts education is designed to train the mind rather than impart specific facts, something more than a gray compromise may result from the debates about internationalization which have already begun in faculty meetings across the nation. (205)

The alternative to a “gray compromise” was a reorganization of the curriculum’s overall structure and pedagogy rather than simply adding, deleting or combining new courses. To accomplish this aim, Byrnes and Thompson argued that the new area studies
programs should not be “divorced” from the undergraduate curriculum as either graduate programs or stand-alone centers, but rather integrated into the general education curriculum in a manner which allows for both the study of specific cultural systems as well as concepts that compare cultural systems (199-232). To accomplish the in-depth study of a culture in undergraduate education, Byrnes and Thompson strongly advocated for increased and better quality curricular and co-curricular study abroad programs which provided full cultural immersion for all students for at least one semester (296).

While Byrnes and Thompson recognized the overall educational value of curriculum reform and study abroad, their primary rationale for internationalization was “overseas service.” Predicting that the need for overseas service would only increase, Byrnes and Thompson described study abroad programs as a “national asset” that helped create a “pool of Americans who have already taken the first steps towards training for overseas service” (215). While their conceptualization of internationalization was quite broad, the purpose was surprisingly specific – designed to take advantage of the U.S.’s leadership role in world affairs.

Similarly, Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams, authors of *The Overseas Americans: A Report on Americans Abroad* (1960), described the rationale of internationalization as creating a “pool of young Americans” who will serve abroad. Like Byrnes and Thompson, they purposed a comprehensive approach grounded in liberal education techniques: a restructuring and integration of area studies programs into the undergraduate/general education curriculum; numerous study abroad programs; and a curriculum infused with non-Western survey courses.

However, Cleveland et. al expanded the scope of their rationale to involve all graduating students – whether or not they went overseas for “service.” They argued more generally that the current educational offerings were not adequate for the needs of the 20th century, stating that “…liberal education must be universal in outlook, drawing on the values, experience and aspirations of all peoples and cultures” (Ibid).

The tone and recommendations of *The Overseas Americans* were expanded further in “The College and World Affairs,” a report of the Committee on the College and World Affairs (1964) comprised of university presidents from Haverford, Indiana, Dartmouth, Duke, Mills, and Carleton. The report looked specifically at the adequacy of the undergraduate curriculum to teach students the fundamental skills, attitudes, and values to succeed in a new world of “pervasive and tumultuous change.” It is perhaps the first such report on global/intercultural learning ever produced, and one of many to follow.

Like the previous documents, “The College and World Affairs” warned against simply adding new courses or half-heartedly introducing new cross-cultural material to existing ones. What was needed instead was a comprehensive reform of the curriculum, “one of those fundamental overhauls that have kept it alive for centuries” (Ibid, 2). This
reform should tackle the new complexity of the world situation, the pluralism of cultures, and perhaps especially the “continuous interaction among peoples, cultures and states” (Ibid, 9).

To do this effectively required a “higher level of understanding” (Ibid, 4). It would include introductory sessions/courses about the meaning and influence of culture, followed by intensive study of one to two cultures in depth. This kind of education would also include study abroad programs integrated with the rest of the educational program, and would better utilize foreign students in a dynamic international learning process.

To accomplish these goals, the report suggested two main strategies. The first was to engage, hire, and train faculty to think and research internationally as well as recruiting visiting scholars (Ibid, 16-22). The second was to undergo a comprehensive curriculum review to make sure international education was not marginalized but rather allowed for compromises and re-tooling of existing courses.

The committee realized the difficulties that this challenge presented, saying:

If we adopt the premise that liberal learning should be universal in outlook, drawing upon the experience and outlook of all peoples and cultures, the task becomes virtually impossible. Increasingly, the emphasis must therefore be on utilizing greater selectivity and on developing more effective approaches to knowledge, especially if undergraduate education is to be a genuinely relevant preparation not only for a vocation but for the life-long process of liberal learning. (Ibid, 33)

Mirroring the ideas of Byrnes and Thompson, the report made the case that the curriculum should not impart specific facts or worry too much about detailing the broad history and current complexity of all civilization. Rather, it focused more on developing tools of understanding to train the mind to evaluate different forms of knowledge from a cross-cultural perspective. It gave several examples from Mills College and Dartmouth College of new undergraduate programs designed to accomplish these goals. Finally, it called for a “revolution in education” that would put internationalism at the very heart and center of a college education.

While this article will not look at the causes and effects of particular university structures, there is no doubt that some of these efforts to reexamine the curriculum and the university’s strategies led to programmatic reorganization. According to separate articles written by Shank, Neal and Nason, writing in the major post-WWII publication for international education, Overseas, the 1950s and early 1960s brought about the first development of international centers and offices – as well as new administrative titles such as Director of International Programs or Chief International Officer. These new offices and positions were designed to house services for international students, study
abroad programs, curricular initiatives and service projects in one central “hub” and integrate activities together (1964).

Neal, for instance, was the newly-appointed Director of the International Office at the University of Texas. In his article “Developing the International Office,” Neal outlined a blueprint for international offices/centers as they are conceptualized today. He noted that previous to the 1960s, international activities were uncoordinated and regulated to lower administrative offices, which led to lower quality study abroad programs and overseas projects (1964). By appointing a senior international officer reporting to the president or executive staff and establishing an international coordinating committee, Neal argued that universities can consolidate resources and think strategically. At the same time, however, Neal thought that the main teaching and research functions should still be left to the faculty with little international office interference (Ibid).

Shank, then the Executive Vice President of IIE, argued for a slightly different purpose for international offices. Although he admitted that part of the reason for the new offices and positions were due to government and foundation grants/contracts, he stated, “More importantly, many institutions themselves are intensely assessing their present roles in international affairs and systematically planning expanded programs” (1964). Shank went on to list a broad range of components of internationalization, from a re-organized general curriculum to the creative use of visiting overseas faculty. Unlike Neal, he viewed the role of the international office as both administrative and academic, a true centralized teaching and research hub led, preferably, by a senior faculty member.

Nason, too, believed that even liberal arts colleges must reconsider their strategies and consider the academic rationale for internationalization. Then the president of Carleton College, one of the first liberal arts institutions to set internationalization as a strategic priority, he stated, “…the essence of liberal learning is to enable man to see himself in perspective” (1964). Nason saw a more interconnected world as a chance not to directly promote democracy, peace and understanding, but to understand more fundamentally “…how cultures have developed and how they alter one another through dynamic interaction” (Ibid). Nason, then, saw a more comparative approach to the curriculum as an extension of the liberal arts mission of training the mind for life-long learning. Accordingly, he viewed international students on campus as part of a crucial two-way educational process, rather than just an opportunity for them to be socialized/Americanized, to bring in prestige, or to conduct research (Ibid). Of course, this sort of viewpoint may have been easier to cultivate at a small liberal arts college than a major research university.
**Wilson’s Integrated Campus and World Citizen Models**

With most of his work conducted at least a decade earlier than these internationalization movements, Wilson (1956; 1947a; 1947b) was a pioneer thinker of post-WWII “liberal” education. A former faculty member at the Harvard Graduate School of Education and researcher of world-wide comparative approaches to social studies and geography teaching, Wilson was appointed a program director with Carnegie and director of one of the initial UNESCO education studies in 1947.

Wilson believed that one of the fundamental challenges to higher education in the 20th century was the growing gap between curriculum and co-curriculum, or similarly between intellectual and “real-world” learning (1956). This gap is a finding repeated a decade or so later in Jenks and Riesman’s major study of the *Academic Revolution*, a rise in professionalism, decentralization and functions of the American university (1969). As he toured around colleges and universities in the 1950s, Wilson observed:

> The problem of the “unintegrated college” is one of the major troubles in higher education in the United States today. American colleges and universities – large or small, rural or urban, public or private, vocational or nonvocational have drifted into a situation in which the curriculum and the extra-curriculum are too frequently working at cross-purposes. (1956, 2)

While agreeing that the American college/university had a long history of un-integration of academics and “everything else,” Wilson believed that the diversity of educational missions – from educating students for liberal learning and living in a good society to conducting new research and service – was creating conceptual confusion for students, who thus were rebelling in ways different from previous eras.

This dynamic was especially true, Wilson believed, concerning world affairs. The rapidly expanding world situation demanded a reintegration of curriculum and co-curriculum, where each would compliment one another, so that, “…college life itself may contribute effectively to education about foreign relations and international affairs which is demanded by the age in which today’s students live” (Ibid, 35).

Wilson argued for what is essentially now considered “Internationalization at Home” (IaH), a term used to describe the foundations of an interculturally-minded campus that includes a curriculum and “experiences” for all students, whether they travel abroad or not (Mestenhauser 2005, 2006; Nilsson, 2003; Teekens, 2006). While issues of diversity and access to study abroad programs were less of a factor in Wilson’s era, his concepts of IaH are quite similar to the modern definitions. Wilson called for:

1. A whole new look to university and college campuses, featuring buildings and architectural spaces influenced, designed or gifted by other cultures and educational partners
2. International houses and dormitories
3. Rotating international speakers and visiting scholars  
4. Cultural festivals  
5. Lectures and assemblies  
6. New library spaces (1956, 35)

The key factor of these ideas would be their connection to the curriculum, so that courses would be integrated with visiting scholars, buildings on campus tied with educational partners overseas, and cultural festivals influenced by strategic attempts to incorporate international students into a two-way learning process. Wilson recognized the challenge of that kind of strategy: “Obviously, educational activities made possible through these nonformal assets of university life are not easily organized or coordinated. When controlled or pre-planned in any mechanical fashion they lose their effectiveness” (Ibid, 68). A delicate balance between coordination and de-centralization was needed.

The ultimate goal, according to Wilson, was to create an “ideal campus” designed to teach the basic concepts of international relations, cultural difference, geography, world civilization, as well as equip students with skills to solve international questions (Ibid, 69). This ideal campus would produce “…graduates who, in their respective professions and communities, would have the will and the knowledge to become leaders in the public determination of policy” (Ibid).

Again, the ideals expressed here are not much different from those of the current movement to produce “global citizens,” or to equip students with skills, knowledge areas and values reflecting a globalized world. Wilson’s ideas reflected a growing idea of diversity in the latter half of the 20th century – in creating environments that extended the liberal education ideal to encompass a variety of perspectives, cultures, genders and races.

Almost a decade earlier, in fact, Wilson had presented a model for a “world citizen” to incorporate three basic areas of educational development:

1. Knowledge, ideas, and concepts (intellectual awareness)  
2. Attitudes, sensitivities, feelings (emotional awareness)  
3. Skills and techniques (1947a)

In a 1947 conference at Princeton that also attracted the likes of Albert Einstein, Wilson also called this “world citizen” the “international civil servant,” one who would not only understand an interdependent world, but would be called to act upon his or her convictions – to consider oneself truly a “citizen of the world,” rather than that of a nation-state (1947b).
Other Voices: International Education and UNESCO

As Sylvester notes in his review of international education literature in the post-WWII period, this tension between “international” and “national” education was a central struggle that led not to agreement, but to a diverse set of theories, rationales and activities – not only in the U.S. but also globally. Sylvester notes that, for instance, in the meetings dealing with the formation and early years of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), it was difficult to get member nations to agree upon a common, detailed definition of international education (2003). The Constitution of UNESCO states, in part, “…since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed…peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind” (1945). Sylvester observes that there was considerable debate about exactly what kind of education fits this description, and the UNESCO Constitution offered little specifics. Over the next few years, UNESCO repeatedly gathered global experts together to further hammer out the theories and details, with little substantive progress (Sylvester, 2003).

Kenworthy, one of the lead authors of an early UNESCO report, attempted to define an “internationally-minded person” with 14 “beliefs” ranging from “universal respect for diversity” to a “spirit of inquiry” and 8 “conceptual areas” which “could be translated into aims of education for a world society” (Sylvester, 2003; Kenworthy, 1947, 1951). Still, Kenworthy agreed that it was difficult to navigate the relationship between national and international education:

Everywhere nationalism is a potent force, and there is still fear lest too much emphasis upon education for a world society result in minimizing education for national citizenship…The one phrase which various nations seem to be willing to use is ‘education for international understanding’ as attested to by the adoption of this phraseology by UNESCO after long and heated debates. These words imply a less ambitious approach and one which most governments are willing to approve. (1951, 200)

Kandel, another prominent education researcher of the post-WWII era, was critical of the UNESCO approach. As Sylvester notes, Kandel believed that international education must rise from national education, just as the concept of “world citizenship” must be continuous with local and national citizenship. Kandel felt that UNESCO would be not be effective, being “outside the direct and immediate concerns of members” and that, realistically, international education needed to grow out of the national aims. Writing in the International Review of Education, Kandel stated:

The international aspect means the injection of a new spirit into the content of the curriculum, which would conduce to an emphasis on cultural rather than
aggressive nationalism….From the national point of view the function of
education is to train the citizen; from the international point of view that function
is to train the citizen as a human being. The two aims are, therefore, not
incompatible but are complimentary. (1955, 12-13)

Kandel seemed to suggest, then, that international organizations like UNESCO a)
took responsibility away from the national education system to educate for “citizenship as
a human being,” and b) were unrealistic in their goals of creating world peace and
understanding unless deep changes were made at home. He believed that relations
between nations did not directly benefit or improve because of cultural exchange itself;
assuming so, perhaps, put too much emphasis on haves and have-nots, on power
relationships, and on the surface elements of culture, and less on the fundamental
learning outcomes of an internationalized curriculum. Kandel, then, advocated for a more
directly educational approach, where the foundations of the curriculum were reorganized
and restructured to account for different cultural perspectives of knowledge, citizenship
and what constitutes a “good society.”

Deutsch, the renowned political scientist, also warned that internationalization
had the potential to do more harm than good, if not structured correctly. International
students here in the U.S. for example, were subject to a possible clash in values,
disintegration, “denial of acceptance,” or – especially given the world situation at the
time – envy over power and resource differences (1952). Deutsch felt that
internationalization could lead to increased and even dangerous nationalism. He
advocated for educational structures that accounted for these potential pitfalls and
allowed “…identification with us, without destroying identification with their own
personalities and memories and with their own people at home” (Ibid). This concept of
dual cultural identification in stages is similar to the Development Model of Intercultural
Sensitivity (DMIS) later developed by Bennett (1993).

In the post-WWII period, political scientists like Deutsch developed theories of
internationalization that overlapped educational policy and psychology with foreign
policy. These theorists – among them academics, policy makers and government leaders
– viewed internationalization as a system that utilized new thinking and methodologies in
the social sciences. In fact, it was Deutsch who was a pioneer in applying ideas of
cybernetics and systems theory to the study of social relations – whether the subject
matter was international relations or individual social mobility. In the prospectus to his
1963 book The Nerves of Government, Deutsch wrote that the book aimed to reorient
“…political thought toward a greater interest in seeing government and politics as
potential instruments of social learning, of social and economic development, and of
intellectual and moral growth.” The next section will look at government programs and
innovative thinkers who helped advance the discourse of internationalization using some
of these concepts.
Cultural Diplomacy and the Citizen as Change Agent

This article will not attempt to be a comprehensive review of everything that is sometimes called “cultural diplomacy,” “public diplomacy,” “citizen diplomacy” or even “soft power.” Like international education and internationalization, these terms have a long, intricate history – one that was chronicled quite extensively in Arndt’s *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (2005) and other books and articles. Instead, I will try to make some comparisons between the ideas of cultural diplomacy developed in the post-WWII era and the push for internationalization in higher education. Specific government acts and policies will also be looked at in this context.

Duggan (1943), one of the founders of IIE and an influential early political scientist, believed that U.S. educational and cultural values should be the “beacon of hope” to other nations and that educational exchange was the primary way to influence the spread of democratic ideals. Duggan’s first proposal for IIE – recounted in his memoir *A Professor at Large* – was largely as a diplomatic organization similar in function to parts of the U.S. State Department and other government agencies. Duggan wanted IIE to be called the “Institute of International Relations” with a mission to study “all aspects of the life of a country – its political, economic, social, and cultural conditions – and distribute the results of these studies widely among the agencies of information in the U.S. for subsequent dissemination among our people (Ibid). Duggan’s “Institute of International Relations,” then, was somewhat of a precursor to the area studies programs that were launched at colleges and universities in the late 1940s and 1950s. Another mission of this new institute, according to Duggan, was to disseminate information on the U.S. to nations around the world, and to strengthen ties between cultures using exchange and scholarship programs (Ibid). Parts of his plan would later be adopted in various governmental agencies.

There is some evidence that while Duggan’s original plan for the institute was rejected, he carried forward with many of its ideals as director of IIE for the organization’s first 25 years. Halpern, who in the late 1960s conducted a seminal study of IIE’s history to that point, found that Duggan was an true optimist who believed that simply exchanging people across borders created peace (1969). “Educational exchange, being morally good, required little analysis or questioning,” Halpern found of Duggan’s philosophy (Ibid). Until the early 1960s, then, IIE performed little research into the results of its programs, and it was hesitant to take up the subject of internationalization of colleges and universities as a whole. For instance, Duggan believed without much evidence that U.S. students should only study abroad as graduate students, once their “national education” was firmly in place, so as not to become “denationalized or expatriates” (1943, 49).
Poets and Philosophers in Government

As Arndt’s study and others recount in detail, the history of cultural affairs, international cooperation, and government – beginning at least with Duggan, Cordell Hull¹ and others in the 1930s but probably even tracing back to the formation of the union – is a complex one. It is probably an understatement to say that in the post!WWII period, even up to the late 1950s, there was considerable debate not only between internationalists and isolationists, but especially between internationalists themselves. Arndt found a kind of see-saw effect happen, where one administration or department would attempt to set policies for cultural diplomacy in one strategic direction, only to be entirely dismantled and replaced by another (Ibid). There was very little consistency or “coordination,” and a number of new agencies and departments were created that overlapped in goals and missions. These included the United States Information Agency (USIA, 1953-1999), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 1961 – present), and the Bureau of Cultural Affairs (CU, now the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1961 – present) within the U.S. State Department.

Still, there were a few officials in government – some of them, perhaps ironically, noted academics lured in briefly to civic work – that did attempt to bring some clarity to the government’s efforts at cultural diplomacy and exchange. Archibald MacLeish, the celebrated American poet and Librarian of Congress, was in 1945 one of the first to assume the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs. MacLeish helped bring the debate about what encompasses international education and cultural cooperation to front and center as one of the founders of UNESCO. According to biographer Donaldson (1992), MacLeish almost solely drafted the UNESCO constitution mentioned earlier, in which he wrote:

That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern…That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind…For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives…²

¹ Secretary of State from 1933 to 1944 and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945 for his role in forming the United Nations, Hull was also deeply concerned with cultural exchange and diplomacy.
² http://www.icomos.org/unesco/unesco_constitution.html, accessed 02/02/08
As the constitution goes on to specify, one of the principal ways to accomplish these goals were “mass communication” and its “free flow of ideas by word and image” (Ibid). What he had in mind was perhaps not purely educational exchange but rather a broader, more ambitious goal of mass cultural and artistic exchange.

As noted earlier there was considerable debate in the details of such a complex proposal. MacLeish himself was not around long enough to fully explore them, resigning as Assistant Secretary of State after only one year and as delegate to UNESCO shortly after. There is some indication – although there seem to be few in-depth accounts of this part of his life – that MacLeish left government because of frustrations over the U.S. role in UNESCO, and the bureaucracies surrounding it both abroad and at home (Donaldson, 1992). Writing to Dean Acheson 3 in 1945, he said:

It was my understanding…that we were to see to it that UNESCO included in its field of jurisdiction the international activities of the mass media. Indeed, it could hardly expect to work at its principal task of promoting international understanding rapidly and broadly unless the mass media were included…If, however, the [State] Department feels that the principal functions of the UNESCO Constitution should be performed by other agencies, then I should say that the sooner we deflated, or forgot, the whole thing, the better…Going around to talk at public meetings about the importance of UNESCO when the newspapers indicate that the Department thinks very little of the reasons I advance at these meetings for the importance of UNESCO, makes me look like I perhaps am but would rather not be in public. (1983, 338-339)

MacLeish was especially concerned here about the role of the State Department, the principal U.S. agency concerned with foreign policy. If UNESCO had a role within State, there was a far greater chance that international cooperation and exchange would have central importance in foreign policy. Crucial to this idea, MacLeish thought, was the role of mass media and the importance that mass media not be farmed out to other agencies (as it would, later, in the form of USIA). In the letter to Acheson, he referred to a news article that suggested that mass media and other areas mentioned in UNESCO would in fact not be supported by the State Department (Ibid).

But although he set much of the groundwork for theories of government-private cooperation in cultural diplomacy, MacLeish had surprisingly little to say about the role of education. Coombs (1965), the first Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, expanded on earlier theories of cultural diplomacy – specifically, to dissect the role of education – in his The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. Like many of his peers in academia, Coombs believed

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3 Senior official in the Department of State until 1944, Undersecretary from 1945 – 1949, and Secretary of State from 1949 – 1953
the world was increasingly interconnected through economic and technological revolutions, and that global interdependency placed demands on universities to reform their curriculums to create “citizens, specialists, and leaders” prepared to live and work in a “community of mankind.”

Coombs saw one of the fundamental problems of post-WWII society as a world which was increasingly disconnected in psycho-social terms. He blamed this situation on what he saw as an unnecessary (and undemocratic) separation between foreign policy and educational internationalization. Coombs believed that “the purpose of international education, indeed all of education, is to help close the dangerous gap between the economic and technological interdependence of the peoples of the world and the misconceptions and myths which keep them apart” (Ibid). Thus, he proposed that educational exchange and other international dimensions of the curriculum were the “fourth dimension” of foreign policy – “a positive instrument of foreign policy, designed to mobilize human resources just as military and economic policies seek to mobilize physical resources” (Ibid). On a broader scale, Coombs thought that internationalization would help close the psycho-social gaps amongst people and cultures.

Mobilizing these resources, Coombs realized, would require tremendous shifts in attitudes, structures, and perhaps especially partnerships between the government and the private sector. Coombs observed:

Indeed, the private sector is still very much the senior partner in this aspect of U.S. foreign relations, and unless the general public takes a large and direct hand in international cultural activities, the government can accomplish very little. In this aspect of foreign policy, more than any other, the individual citizen or private organization can have a decided influence on the course of events. (Ibid, 3)

Naturally, Coombs overarching rationale for international education was to win the Cold War on “terms favorable to the interests of the United States and other democratic nations” (Ibid, 113). But he also considered it an enlightened form of education and a more truly democratic direction for U.S. foreign policy. Given the highly politicized nature of the ideas, however, he proposed four essential questions:

1. Should educational and cultural activities – at least those sponsored by the federal government – be consciously aimed at foreign policy objectives? Or should they be treated as ends in themselves, best divorced from foreign policy?
2. Should educational and cultural programs be intermingled with foreign information activities (“propaganda”) or sharply divorced from them? Is there, in fact, a clear distinction?
3. What is the relationship of educational and cultural exchange programs to technical assistance and aid for economic development? Do they have different missions, or are they part and parcel of the same thing?
4. How should government activities in this whole field be organized and administered to insure unity of direction and maximum efficiency and effectiveness? (Ibid, 23-24)

Coombs did not offer any answers to these questions, and like MacLeish he also resigned from his position without exploring many of his assumptions. These questions were instead taken up by his successor, Frankel, a professor of philosophy at Columbia. Even before he became the next Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (1965 – 1967), Frankel had been an important voice in the link between international education and government policy.

In Frankel’s *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad* (1965) and *High on Foggy Bottom: An Outsider’s Insider View of Government* (1968), Frankel presented a future-oriented theory of internationalization that was highly ambitious. Primarily, he felt that by refocusing the debate on the fundamental goals of education itself, and of the exchange of intellectuals in society, that by extension human, social and political development in general would be improved.

Like Coombs, Frankel began with the argument that the modern, post-WWII world required a new approach to education and educational exchange. This was due to a number of fundamental changes in “the conditions of power, national and international” (1968, 18) occurring around the globe, summarized in seven broad, interconnected rationales:

1. The collaborative nature and formal organization of intellectual work, where almost no scholarly work or research was done in isolation;
2. Related, the advances in technology bringing people and ideas closer together, particularly in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences and humanities;
3. The connected rise in the importance of intellectuals to a position of pivotal importance in any society;
4. Tremendous changes in communication and communication techniques, especially in mass media;
5. The rivalry of modern states in demonstrating their preeminence in scientific research, technical invention, and artistic creation;
6. At the same time, changes in international relations, where foreign and domestic agendas are now often intertwined, and where nations themselves are far more interdependent;
7. The increasingly role of educational institutions in the difficult process of economic and social modernization (1965, 74)

In these rationales Frankel anticipated a number of complexities and challenges. He did not consider himself an optimist, at least along the lines of Duggan; for him, educational exchange did not de facto create peace and mutual understanding. Deliberate educational exchange was only one aspect of a larger system of human and international
relations; naturally, of course, people and nations exchanged ideas and values in numerous other, unintentional ways (including through violence, coercion, and large-scale war), and would continue to do so in the future. Failing to recognize this, Frankel said, led to unrealistic expectations and demands for educational and cultural exchange (1965, 70). Similar to Kandel, Frankel argued that it was better to view educational exchange as a long-term, enduring goal, beneficial to national education if nothing else, rather than one that would produce immediate results.

But even realizing these unrealistic expectations, Frankel thought that divorcing educational relations from other relations – as part of a dynamic system – was a mistake. He wrote, “They are not a separate kind of relationship; they are a product of any kind of continuing contact between nations - and if the quality of human experience is the touchstone of value, they are the most important product” (Ibid, 68). For example, regarding rationale #7, Frankel argued that post-WWII era experience had showed that economic development was intimately intertwined with educational and cultural development (Ibid, 69).

Frankel argued persuasively for the increasing involved of intellectuals, artists, and scientists in the discourse on international affairs. But, worried that his earlier focus on intellectuals would come across as too elitist, in his later study Frankel expanded even further on the rationales above, arguing for the “new role” that both intellectuals and citizens played in the modern world:

The lines going out from the arts, sciences and education have become the life lines for most societies…and all of these areas of activity – the arts, the sciences, education – have particular importance for that segment of the population in contemporary which is growing most dramatically in numbers and influence – the youth…this segment of the population is crucial to future human development. (18)

At the crux of his view was the role of colleges and universities. These institutions were not only the home of the intellectual community, but were agents of social mobility, of public conscience, and moral debate. They were also the training ground for new teachers, professionals, and civil servants. And they played an increasingly complex role in national and community development, as a hub of research innovation and a provider of new jobs.

On an international scale, however, Frankel was concerned about academic and informational inequality being the same or greater than economic inequalities, and similarly, that a successful “international political economy” and integration of trade would depend on a greater integration of ideas and cultures. Thus, a first purpose of increasing educational relations would be “a more equitable distribution of ideas and information” through structures for collaboration (Ibid, 23).
Frankel’s ‘Restatement of Purposes’

Frankel believed that the fundamental components of internationalization were already present within different areas of the government as well as the academic sector, but that they were unexamined and conceptually confusing. Calling for a “restatement of purposes,” he outlined five areas of international education and internationalization development: 1) the lacing together of educational systems; 2) the improvement of the context of communication; 3) the disciplining and extending of international intellectual discourse, 4) international educational development; and 5) the furthering of educational and cultural relations as ends in themselves (1965, 99).

Broadly speaking, then, Frankel was not just concerned with internationalization but its link with what might be called the globalization of human development. Specifically in areas one and four, he felt that the U.S. could have a leading role in developing (with shades of the Internet), “an international knowledge bank…information-retrieval systems and computerized networks for the communication of knowledge” (1968, 24). Such an effort, if managed correctly, would go a long way in reducing ignorance and helping with human suffering, and would empower intellectuals and citizens in nations abroad to use this knowledge within their own cultural context (Ibid). Another key factor was framing international development in the context of educational rather than simply in economic terms, since economic development by itself could lead to growing feelings of inequality, dependence, and/or vulnerability. An international knowledge system would also help with the so-called “brain drain,” a concept first introduced in the post-WWII period (Ibid, 24-25).

Thus, a restatement of purposes would emphasis the importance of mutual, shared exchange of knowledge and information between intellectuals, academics and citizens - what Frankel called “an international circulation of brains” (Ibid, 25) or elsewhere “the internationalization of scholarship and education” (1965, 100). This would not be “Americanization” but rather an international community of scholarship. If this international community was “laced” together with the same rigor as economic and political relations, Frankel felt there was a better and deeper potential for future human interdependence.

The other areas of restatement supported this main idea. In “improving the context of communication,” he argued that cultural exchange must be separated from propaganda and persuasion, and placed in appropriate comparative context. Frankel feared that propaganda was often confused with cultural norms, and that it was often cruelly taken out of context by both the sender and the receiver. In his view, then, exchange of people for long periods of time was better than quick exchanges of cultural artifacts, which are often misinterpreted (Ibid, 106). In “disciplining and extending international intellectual discourse,” Frankel suggested that we more fully examine the
language of international affairs and human relations – words like “democracy,” “communism,” and the “free world.” If the debate and discourse of these terms were brought to light in transnational discussions, they might produce further clarity in international relations, creating a shared language (Ibid, 106 – 108). Similarly, in his later work, Frankel felt this “disciplining” would help teach everyone (scholars, students, citizens) the values of intercultural understanding and the habit of cooperation over competition (1968, 25). For example, wouldn’t major discussion over the problems that affect all human society be improved if three or four universities in different countries shared facilities or curricula, or if something like an international teaching corps was created, where teachers from different countries would rotate to different schools around the world (Ibid, 25 – 26)?

It is in this context that Frankel tackled international development and “technical assistance.” He realized that confronting this area would lead to tough questions, and would necessitate major changes in a U.S. foreign policy dominated by a Cold War science race, and an “us-helping-them” mentality. But Frankel felt that a realistic start to these questions might be advanced by re-framing two major activities – educational assistance and the curricula of U.S. universities and colleges. In educational assistance, he called for a deeper emphasis on the purposes of education (enduring understanding rather than immediate assistance, and the development of education in general); in the curricula, he felt the U.S. could make major advances by the simple “broadening of perspectives” (Ibid, 29-29).

Of course, Frankel realized how broad and ambitious this “restatement of purposes” was. It would not only call for international agreement and cooperation, but it would have to change what was in his view a basic problem of modern life, echoed by Coombs and others – the disconnect between private citizens and government. At the same time that intellectuals were being raised in importance in society, there was, he believed, a “deepening gulf between intellect and power, between the “system” and its watchmen and critics. It thus helps to freeze the society it governs into self-distrust and self-alienation” (Ibid, 34).

It was shocking to Frankel, then, when his 1965 study and “restatement of purposes” helped lead to him being nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. As he himself noted, considering that he had spent over 150 pages criticizing the government, it was more than ironic that he would be selected for a major role in the Department of State, with a direct line to several Congressional committees and presidential advisors.  

Undoubtedly, his appointment had complex political foundations. Among them was the likelihood that President Johnson wanted to appease Senator Fulbright, who had become a harsh critic, and felt Fulbright would be encouraged by this nomination given the similarities between Fulbright’s and Frankel’s views on cultural diplomacy (Frankel, 1968).
Frankel’s diary and reflections of his time in the role are a unique study in turning theory to action. He quickly realized that although his theories were well-received, they were anything but easy to implement within his bureau and in Washington at large (1968). An even when, to his amazement, they were brought near the forefront of domestic and foreign policy, there was confusion among government officials about what the ideas really meant. Frankel’s 1965 study led to a memorandum sent to President Johnson, which further led to Frankel and a special task force drafting the President’s Smithsonian Address on International Education (1965), the President’s Special Message to the Congress Proposing International Education and Health Programs (1966), and later the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966. I will return to that confusion later.

As Frankel observed, at the forefront of any discussion about international education and its relationship to foreign policy and relations was the role and definition of culture. In government, he observed, there were various definitions of culture that differed somewhat or entirely from the academic version. There was the theory that culture was “high culture” – the performing arts, visual arts and other surface-level products and events. There was also the theory that culture was a “barrier” to progress, something that primarily developing nations held on to at their own peril. Finally, in another related sub-definition, culture was the “old” – Venice or the Great Wall or other such cultural artifacts and historical sites (1968). Culture was rarely viewed in government as something more complex and contextual, a fundamental system of viewing the world and sharing values.

These concepts were just one of many reasons why most educational and cultural exchange programs in the post-WWII period were often tied to propaganda, competition, and persuasion rather than deeper intellectual exchange. There were, of course, a few exceptions. Before examining the presidential addresses and the International Education Act, it is important to back up just a little and briefly review the prior pieces of legislation on international education introduced by Congress as well as some other voices on international education policy.

Fulbright, Smith-Mundt, NDEA, and Fulbright-Hays

There were four major pieces of post-WWII legislation that helped set the agenda – and helped fuel the confusion – about international education. Most of these have been the subject of numerous studies and discussions of Cold War history and propaganda, and therefore will not be analyzed in full here. Rather, I will argue that the tone and goals of each act show further evidence of a kind of schizophrenic approach to international education, a perhaps unintentional set of checks and balances over rationales and purposes.

For instance, the Fulbright Act of 1946 – perhaps the most famous of these acts – created a well-funded scholarship program for students and scholars to spend a
significant amount of time in another country conducting professional or academic research. The goal was mutual understanding through cultural exchange, with the hopes that the exchange of intellectuals and young students would increase world peace. Just two years later, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 (also called the Information and Educational Exchange Act) placed more emphasis on the promotion of the American image abroad, largely through the radio program *Voice of America*. This is the act that led to the creation of USIA in 1953 and largely took mass media exchange out of the Department of State and into a separate agency, as MacLeish had warned against. In just two years, then, Congress had created two landmark acts for international education and cultural diplomacy which seemed to at the very least not relate to each other if not provide full contradiction.

The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, meanwhile, provided considerable support for a revised international studies curriculum, and gave birth to the “area studies” programs for colleges and universities. Most scholars of NDEA agree that the act was motivated by the Soviet launch of Sputnik rather than any concern with educational cooperation. Once again, mixed messages were sent since, as noted earlier, this was also the time of significant curricular reform and growth in exchange programs.

Updating and expanding many of the ideas of the original Fulbright Act, the Fulbright-Hays (Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange) Act of 1961 was the first attempt to examine the central role of education in international relations. The act was created to “strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations” and to “promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement, and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.” The act called for additional educational and cultural exchanges, as well as “centers…for cultural and technical interchanges.” In addition, it provided funding for American studies courses and American-style educational institutions abroad. In an initial sign of the related internationalization of U.S. colleges and universities, it also signaled for exchanges to build the cultural and area studies knowledge of U.S. professors and teachers. Finally, it also provided funding for increased exchanges of students and scholars to the U.S., particularly from “less developed friendly foreign countries.”

In his review and observations of government legislation on international education, Frankel recognized that one of the major reasons for the diversity of rationales and purposes of these acts was not just the different whims and policies of presidential administrations or even urgent national needs (such as NDEA after Sputnik), but rather a product of the unintended consequences of a growing government with different

http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/iegps/fulbrighthaysact.pdf, accessed 02/02/08
reporting structures. Duplication was the norm and few people in one side of the government knew what the other was doing (1968). Educational and cultural affairs was part of the “mission” of a vast array of agencies and departments, from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to the Department of State and even, in some cases, the Defense Department.

The second major reason for conceptual confusion was the difference between domestic legislation and foreign policy. Frankel observed that in the short history of U.S. international education, several proponents were stalled in their efforts because Congress – and to some extent the American people – did not understand that it included domestic legislation intended to benefit schools and universities as well as peace and understanding abroad (Ibid).

**The Relationship of Education to International Development**

Historical documents and literature show that beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was considerable mutual recognition that the past approach to international education was at best a random collection of programs and activities. The ideas advanced by Coombs, Frankel and others can perhaps be more accurately viewed, then, in the context of similar efforts to define the relationship between what Vestal calls the “at least three major strands” of international education. Vestal argues that these three strands were formally agreed-upon during the congressional hearings on the IEA (1994, 13).

The three major strands as defined then were: 1) content of curricula, 2) movement of scholars and students concerned with training and research, and 3) arrangements that engage a system of education in technical assistance and educational cooperation programs beyond its national boundaries (Ibid). What this consensus failed to indicate, however, is the precise relationship between these elements, specifically between domestic curricula and student/scholar mobility, and between education and development. Perhaps more importantly, there needed to be some agreement over who would lead and coordinate such a multi-dimensional effort.

In order to solve this issue, several experts suggested creating a kind of semi-autonomous “center” or “institute” for international education and affairs, somewhat along the model of the National Institute of Health, National Science Foundation, or the Smithsonian Institution (Vestal, 1994, 74-75). This center, of course, would not only coordinate domestic international education policy but would also be the umbrella organization for liaising with international bodies like UNESCO and national educational systems. Significantly, most proposals for the center included management of educational development assistance abroad.

The idea for the center, later manifested in the IEA as the Center for Educational Cooperation (CEC), can be traced back to John W. Gardner’s influential report _Aid and_
The Universities (1964) and perhaps earlier, as will be explored below. The report detailed the emerging role of universities (particularly the large land-grant institutions) in overseas development assistance. Somewhat lost now in the overall recommendations—which have been used by some scholars to examine overall U.S. foreign policy and Cold War “nation-building”—was Gardner’s nuanced discussion of where the administrative power for educational development should lie. In his report, which Gardner wrote when he was President of Carnegie, he suggested that a new unit be created within USAID to deal with educational cooperation and assistance as opposed to strict economic or technical assistance. Frankel took this idea and expanded it in his works referred to earlier, and ultimately as part of the IEA the CEC was to be initially located within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), not coincidentally then run by Gardner (Vestal, 1994, 74-75). As Vestal notes, the New York Times, in a 1966 editorial, felt that placing the center within HEW “could and should…remove the widely held suspicion abroad that American institutions and scholars on foreign soil are mere extensions, if not outright agents, of U.S. policy.” In addition to being a genuine policy idea, the CEC was surely in part a political tool used to help appease suspicious groups both at home and abroad, and I will come back to it later in discussions of the IEA.

There were earlier formations of related ideas for a kind of clearinghouse and umbrella organization that would navigate the multifarious relationship between higher education, government, international organizations, and agencies abroad, and they represent perhaps parallel strands of historical development. As I outlined earlier, the earliest idea of such an organization was probably Duggan’s IIE. Arndt’s 2005 study found early ideas of IIE to be a kind of “educational embassy” to the U.S. government. But as Halpern found in his study of IIE’s first 40 years or so (1969), the institute had serious financial problems and was bogged down in administrative work for its exchange programs, unable to fully affect policy discussions or form wide-spread relationships with both domestic and overseas institutions. In short, it never gained or was given enough power to conduct the kind of transformative work like the Smithsonian or NIH. Halpern also suggested that IIE never really gained the trust of the U.S. higher education community (Ibid).

Still, especially after IIE formed a more direct relationship with the federal government in the late 1940s, it held considerable sway and power in educational and

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6 John W. Gardner was President of the Carnegie Corporation and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Johnson. Under his tenure, many of the Great Society reforms in health and education took place. Gardner later founded Common Cause, helped create the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and founded Experience Corps.

7 In 1946, IIE was given administrative control of the new Fulbright program. IIE archives and the Halpern study (1969) hint at a story that is worth exploring further—that of a so-called “Sargeant Report” of 1946. The report reportedly examined whether student exchanges with Latin America should be administered by IIE, as they had been since 1940, or by the federal government. The report is referred to is only mentioned briefly in a September 1946 letter from Nelson Rockefeller to Stephen Duggan (courtesy IIE archives).
cultural policy discussions. One of IIE’s signature pieces of advocacy in the post-WWII period was its 1961 “Report to the President of the United States,” to the Kennedy administration. The report was a summary of a conference on “exchange of persons” held by IIE in December, 1960. The Report mentioned an “over-riding urgency” for educational development abroad, which coincided with Kennedy’s calls for the 1960s to be a “development decade.”

The report involved five major points. It called for a) recognizing that education is the key to international development; b) that higher priority be given to education by US foreign aid programs; c) an increase in investment in international education by both public and private sources; d) building solid infrastructures in other nations; and e) a dramatic enhancement of educational exchange programs to this end. The report argued that these objectives should occur in a logical order, thus proposing that educational exchange is an integral piece – if not the cornerstone – of international development (Ibid).

Unlike Frankel’s later study, the report did not go into great detail about the relationship between educational development and foreign policy, and there was little attempt to connect the dots. It did warn about simply transferring U.S. educational goals and systems to that of developing countries. And it argued that, “educational development abroad can no longer be considered to be merely on the periphery of our national interest; it is at the very center of our interest” (Ibid). The report concluded by recommending the establishment of an educational or cultural foundation along the lines of the National Science Foundation (Ibid), a precursor idea for the CEC.

Ford, the Morrill Report and the Creation of Education and World Affairs

Another crucial parallel historical strand in the internationalization story, beginning in the late 1950s and extending to the early 1970s, has to do with the role of the major U.S. philanthropic foundations. The key players were Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller. By sheer numbers alone, the Ford Foundation was far and away the leader – between 1950 and 1977, Ford committed $335 million to American university-based programs which included support for international studies programs, area studies, the teaching of foreign languages, and the exchange of students and scholars (Hertko, 1996, 17). It also had far-reaching influence in setting the conceptual foundations and policies for internationalization and its relationship with government policy. This influence was manifested in the creation in 1962 of a now-defunct organization, Education and World Affairs (EWA), whose mission was precisely to internationalize U.S. higher education.

Part of the reason for Ford’s tremendous influence was a kind of blurring of the lines between private and public entities. As Hertko found in her 1996 study of EWA’s rise and fall, the Ford Foundation created EWA to “influence policy without the foundations themselves becoming directly involved,” yet Hertko’s findings make it clear
that Ford had quite a lot of influence in the direction of the organization, and thus when it shut down EWA in the late 1970s, it did so as its own “failed experiment” (Ibid). Key players (including many who were involved in the formation of the IEA) shuffled back from Washington to New York (where Ford and EWA were based). Positions frequently changed hands between Ford, government departments, and EWA. Herman B Wells, one of those key players, observed in his 1980 memoir:

> During EWA’s years of operation nearly every important figure in the field of international studies and education in America had some contact with or participation in the work of EWA. Never before or since has there been an enterprise in which the personalities in this field were so universally encompassed.

Yet this was anything but a “big, happy family.” Ford’s interest and relationship with the federal government raised serious concerns among the higher education community. What began as a fairly harmonious relationship and a shared mandate quickly became this failed experiment, exacerbated by the Vietnam War and the struggles of the Johnson administration.

According to Hertko, in the late 1950s the U.S. Department of State sponsored a meeting under the auspices of the American Council on Education which brought together individuals from foundations, businesses, universities, and government to discuss the role of United States colleges and universities in world affairs (Ibid, 24). The result of the meeting was a task force formed by the Ford Foundation, called the Morrill Committee on the University and World Affairs, chaired by J.L. Morrill, former president of the University of Minnesota. The work of the committee was to “explore how the traditional concept of the university can be adapted, in principle and in practice, to present-day relations of the United States with other nations” (Ibid, 25).

The Morrill Committee’s report, *The University and World Affairs* (1961) – and its follow-up, *The College and World Affairs* (1964), discussed earlier – remain the most ambitious set of theses on internationalization in the post-WWII period, if not since. Many of the ideas put forth in the documents foreshadow those later argued by Frankel in his works explored earlier. However, they put a great emphasis on detailing the special function of universities and the role of their domestic curricula, and thus link with some

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8 By all accounts Wells was one of the most prominent and powerful university presidents of the 20th century, having been appointed President of Indiana University in 1938 at the age of 35. He went on to lead Indiana until 1962, with interruptions during the war period to serve for Dean Acheson in foreign affairs and economic cooperation, including helping to form the UN. Even after his “retirement” in 1962, Wells maintained tremendous influence at Indiana, and especially as a frequent consultant to the Ford Foundation and EWA.

9 It seems a mystery as to why neither Frankel nor Coombs referenced the Morrill Report or the subsequent role of EWA in their works. I will explore that problem later in the article.
of the earlier discussions about university curriculum and administrative reform. Ardnt, reviewing the history of cultural diplomacy, called the Morrill Report, “a remarkable document…the most far-reaching private study in the cluster…It conveyed a serious request from the universities for a single government voice to meet the growing needs of the American universities…” (2005, 297-298).

The core rationale for *The University and World Affairs*, not dissimilar from Frankel’s, was a kind of reframing of purposes in order to connect domestic educational problems with international relations. The Morrill Report argued that these two areas were inextricably linked. On the domestic side, current institutions were far too parochial, allowing for little deep understanding of the modern world except perhaps among those who specialized in international studies. On the policy side, as noted earlier there was far too little attention being paid to the role of education and knowledge in international relations, with a disorganized set of government departments and agencies with contrasting agendas.

The Morrill Report’s goals were broad, if not idealistic, calling for a, “…lifting of sights that will transcend the traditionally domestic and Western orientation of scholarship and training in universities and colleges, and the limited aims of “technical assistance” and “national defense,” in government” (1961, 3). But given that the Committee was made up of largely academics and university presidents, the main focus was on the university’s expanding role in modern society.

The special feature of the modern U.S. university, according to the Report, was its relationship to society and national development, beginning almost 100 years earlier with the Morrill Act of 1862 (no relation, ironically to the Morrill Report – although it’s hard to believe the significance of the name was lost at the time). The Morrill Act and subsequent policies helped bring a decidedly American characteristic to higher education to add to teaching and research – that of “service.” Thus, higher education was intimately tied to national development, industrialization and modernization, perhaps most eloquently represented in Van Hise’s “Wisconsin Idea” (1904). So far this idea had mainly been applied to national development, but the Morrill Report recommended that it be significantly expanded to include “service to the world,” something that many land-grant universities (such as Michigan State) were already doing in part through government-financed technical assistance programs.

Here, the Morrill Committee anticipated some heated debates:

It is not surprising that conflicting views have been pressed upon the universities. On the one hand are those who, feeling keenly a grave sense of national urgency, would have the government tell the university how they must serve the new and pressing needs of the nation in world affairs. On the other hand are those who, cherishing the university’s ancient tradition and spirit of scholarship, content that the university’s major contributions to world affairs should come mainly as a
byproduct of its scholarship…If pressed to an extreme, these two points of view are incompatible and untenable…What is needed is a relationship of mutual confidence and accommodation. (12-13)

Although not explicitly stated, a modified version of the Morrill Act to focus on “service to the world” stretched the limits of the cherished notion of academic freedom in U.S. higher education. It might be possible to imagine a mutually beneficial relationship between higher education and national development, but “service to the world” was a different story altogether. However, J.L. Morrill himself was an optimist for government-higher education relations. In a 1955 article shortly before he became chair of the committee, he responded to criticisms of the new role of universities being “agents” of the government, arguing persuasively that the relationship was far more complex than that. He pointed to the fact that institutions with government contracts remained in control of their own actions and retained full autonomy. He was hopeful, and that optimism carried over to the Morrill Committee’s work.

The key pathway for a similar relationship was refocusing energy on the aims and goals of domestic education, rather than on foreign policy. The Morrill report argued that every facet of university and college life – from the curriculum to the co-curriculum – be infused with an international dimension. This effort began with the “competence and the outlook of the faculties” (1961, 15). Faculty should be given new development, training, and space to add knowledge of areas and cultures, rework and develop courses, and strengthen ties with scholars of other countries. Tenure policies that would include international work should be implemented. This reform would lead to a domino effect to change all other aspects of the university, from enhancing student knowledge to more effectively incorporating international students in the learning process.

The other recommendations of the report included a sequential set of reforms that would lead naturally from domestic education to international cooperation and exchange. First, all students should receive an international component to their education, and this international component should be inseparable from the larger purposes of liberal education. Second, for each of these related goals (faculty development and an international component), faculty, deans, and administrators should come together to review the curriculum and co-curriculum, as well as the general strategy of the institution, and to make reforms as necessary. This review should also include international students and their role on campus, study/education abroad programs, service projects, and formal and informal language learning. Third, while the focus of internationalization should be on the first two years of undergraduate study (the general education requirements), reform should also permeate into the deep corners of each discipline – and into graduate and professional training. Fourth, this reform may in fact lead to a restructuring of the disciplines into interdisciplinary “problems” rather than
discipline-based perspectives. Fifth, it may also naturally lead to international scholarship cooperation and development projects abroad, however these projects must arise from cooperative agreements between institutions, not from foreign policy objectives. And finally, that what is needed to coordinate all of these efforts is an office, position, or governing structure located at the highest levels of the university (Ibid).

These six basic recommendations form the basis for many current definitions and strategies for internationalization, and in fact went beyond them. The current emphasis on faculty engagement and development was at the foundation of this report. The existence of an office or governing structure at the highest levels of the institution is now finally beginning to be a commonplace feature of the modern U.S. university. The Committee went beyond these strategies to actually consider the very structures and formation of disciplines and knowledge, and how those reforms linked to cooperation on research and scholarship abroad. Little is currently being said about those aspects of internationalization, although there is some evidence that this is changing (Kehm and Teichler, 2007).

The Committee viewed this reform process as a long-range strategy, one with wide-ranging implications for how intellectual cooperation is viewed:

Some of the past difficulties in university programs in world affairs, at home and abroad, have arisen from the fact that many programs have been sporadic, ad hoc, and inadequately related to one another. What may be needed is a long-range, university-wide approach, under the highest auspices, to the total complex of substantive activities and administrative arrangements in the international field. As each university seeks to determine its own priorities and its own course, opportunities will arise for cooperation within the institution and among institutions, both in this country and abroad. (Ibid, 34)

However, the Morrill Report was less convincing about this latter subject of educational cooperation and its relationship to foreign policy. Beyond calling for a single voice to represent international higher education goals in government, it did not detail how all of these goals should be arranged in policy and in government, as Frankel did later. Rather, it focused more exclusively on the idea of a “universality of scholarship” which would take advantage of an “educational revolution” taking place around the world (Ibid). The Committee argued that this educational revolution was well known in education circles, but little known by Congress. While there seems to be some validity in that statement, it remains debatable whether the “educational revolution” described by the Morrill Report was more rhetoric than reality.

While certainly an improvement to the discourse on the relationship between private and public goals – and at the very least a comprehensive strategic blueprint for an internationalized institution – the Morrill Report said too little about the mechanisms
necessary for broad-based policy improvements. Ardnt calls the Morrill Report, “…indirect, subtle, and allusive, an effort to avoid offending any agency; it was not written in the kind of language that could stir Congress to change its mind” (2005, 298). Because it said little about the details of overseas cooperation, it also perhaps failed to fully reform higher education in the way that it intended. There is evidence that universities indeed rushed to create international programs, but these programs – while better coordinated within the institution itself – were often done without the full cooperation of partners abroad (Hertko, 1996, 74-75).

Ardnt concludes his analysis of the Morrill Report by stating that it “gave birth to a new NGO, Education and World Affairs…But nothing else happened” (2005, 298). According to Arndt, Eisenhower, the outgoing president, regretted not taking advantage of the momentum for international education, believing that Congress just considered education irrelevant to foreign policy (300). There is some evidence of that regret in Eisenhower’s now famous “military-industrial complex” final speech.

Although some considerable time lapsed before the subject would be taken up seriously again in government by Coombs and Frankel, in fact there was true hope – at least among the higher education community – that EWA would be a success. Using archived records of a meeting of university presidents before the creation of EWA, Hertko found that the presidents considered the formation of EWA “urgent” and hoped it would help solve important policy problems that existed between higher education and the government, rather than focus on organization, administration or professional development (1996).

But from its start EWA was plagued with problems of leadership, conceptual confusion, and input from outside influences, according to Hertko’s study. It failed to capture consistent buy-in from the higher education community. It also created some bad feelings between the other organizations concerned with international education and internationalization (namely IIE and ACE), rather than bring these organizations together under one roof. And just as international education was gaining momentum in Congress through Frankel’s work and the IEA, the Ford Foundation became unhappy with EWA’s leadership and management style (Ibid). Finally, there was evidence according to Hertko that the government did not support the new organization. Frankel especially makes no mention of the Morrill Report or EWA in his studies, despite the fact that they shared almost the same language and ideas.

EWA still made important headway into the problem of coordination of international education. It undertook several important studies of the key players, and brought together participants from around the nation for conferences on major issues. According to many participants in the time period, it made significant indirect contributions to the momentum of the IEA, by bring the academic community together in support of it in a way that neither IIE nor ACE would have done (Ibid).
However, in her study Hertko ultimately finds that a number of problems continued to plague EWA’s mission, mostly having to do with the issue of support from Ford. She finds that EWA’s rise and mirrored the priorities of the Ford Foundation, who simultaneously was anxious to see what the federal government would due with IEA. And when Ford shifted focus to domestic problems in the late 1960s, it removed most of EWA’s funding. Ultimately, EWA became defunct, with parts of it morphing into the International Council for Educational Development (ICED), a new organization still in existence devoted almost entirely to educational development abroad. As Hertko reports, the higher education community felt they “lost an ally” when EWA was dissolved (Ibid).

The International Education Act of 1966

Finally, we return to the culmination of the “euphoria” for internationalization, the IEA of 1966 (and President Johnson’s speeches leading up to it) and its idea of a semi-autonomous Center for Educational Cooperation. This is a history recorded in great detail by Vestal (1994), so I will not go into the full mechanics of its life and death in Congress here. Rather, it is important to analyze the text of the speeches in the context of the rest of the article.

The two speeches leading to the IEA were the “Smithsonian” speech of September 1965 and the Special Message to Congress of February 1966. In both speeches, President Johnson makes the case for adding a “world dimension” to his Great Society social programs, based on three proclamations first stated in the Smithsonian speech:

For we know today that certain truths are self-evident in every nation on this earth; that ideas, not armaments, will shape out last prospects for peace; that the conduct of our foreign policy will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms; that the knowledge of our citizens is the one treasure which grows only when it is shared. (in Vestal, 184-186)

As several scholars and Frankel himself noted, the idea of gathering a “world dimension” to education was one that held special personal appeal for Johnson, both because of his background as a teacher and his love for expressions of grandeur. In some respects, the Smithsonian and Congress speeches are much better examples of Johnson political or personal rhetoric rather than statements on the relationship between the “three strands” of international education.\(^\text{10}\) However, the basic concepts came directly from aspects of Frankel, the Morrill Committee, Combs and prior theories.

\(^{10}\) Ardnt observes that although the Smithsonian speech is “internationalist and even universalist…one wonders what LBJ thought he was reading at the Smithsonian” (2005, 389).
Frankel recounted in his 1968 memoir the fascinating process of how his original 1965 study (*The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs*) led to him being nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs and a driving force of President Johnson’s international education policies. While settling in to the position, Frankel drafted a memo based on these 1965 recommendations and sent it to President Johnson. This in turn was used as the basis for the Smithsonian speech, according to Frankel, although Vestal (1994) cites other sources as claiming to have authored the speech. In any case, Frankel reflected on how the draft was changed in the final speech, to be far more expansive, and with a greater prominence given to desire to eliminate poverty in the world. Frankel’s original idea of a world-wide exchange of intellectuals and citizens for the purposes of internationalizing scholarship and ideas had little real authority in the Johnson speeches, although the basic ideas of educational exchange and development were still present. The speeches, as a result, have a bit of a “missionary” bent, and in fact Johnson mentions a “liberating mission” in one of them.

Johnson began the Smithsonian speech by first arguing that the birth of the Smithsonian Institution was the “first example” of scientific and scholarly exchange in the U.S. It was also a successful initial partnership between the public and private sector for the purposes of education and welfare. Finally, he recognized the Smithsonian’s role in the “growth and spread of learning which must be first in a free society” (in Vestal, 183-186).

Thus, the stage was set for the innovative dynamics of the IEA, with its focus on learning and exchange both domestically and abroad, and its call for a new government-education partnership. In the Smithsonian speech, Johnson recognized the ambition of the proposal (“these ideas have not always gained easy acceptance among those employed in my line of work”), but Johnson was convinced nonetheless of the “revolutionary power of ideas” to bring about world peace.

In the later Message to Congress, Johnson outlined more formally the interlocking aspects of the international education plan, and assigned a task force, chaired by Dean Rusk, to prepare the IEA. These interlocking aspects included many of the recommendations put forth earlier by Coombs, Frankel, and the Morrill Committee, and attempted to lace together domestic education with international development. These included the Center for Educational Cooperation outlined earlier, a new corps of Educational Officers abroad, a strengthening of primary and secondary curricula in international studies, grants to support small and developing colleges curricula and programs in international affairs, grants for centers of excellence in international and regional studies, sister schools, an “exchange” Peace Corps, assistance for programs of education in developing countries, and enhanced exchange programs, just to name a few.

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11 Secretary of State from 1961-1969.
It was an ambitious proposal, and one in which almost every line of text and budget was fought and debated in task forces and Congress committees (Frankel, 1968; Vestal, 1994). Although the IEA was ultimately passed, there are numerous reasons for its failure to be funded. Chief among these was clearly the escalation of the Vietnam War. But the war perhaps masked a deeper conflict and debate over the role of education – particularly higher education – in modern U.S. society, a tension taken up in the next essay.

The IEA has been considered a culmination of a long march towards making international education a prominent feature of American society (Vestal, 1994). But in reality, the Johnson speeches are perhaps better understood as interruptions and loose interpretations of the theoretical development of internationalization in the post-WWII period. In its final form, the IEA was not much more than an extension of the Fulbright-Hays Act – an improvement in funding, to be sure, but not quite the educational revolution the Morrill Report had envisioned or the “internationalization of scholarship and education” that Frankel had hoped for.

Studies of the System: Butts, Harari, and Scanlon

If we consider international education/internationalization as a complex system of academic and non-academic components, as Mestenhauser argues, we can better understand the relationship between internationalization and international development. Three prominent scholars working in the time period, Butts (1963; 1969; 1971a; 1971b), Harari (1972), and Scanlon (1960; 1968) acknowledged the presence and interdependency of the system but disagreed (even amongst themselves) about how it should operate.

Each scholar seemed to settle at least on the “three major strands” of the U.S. system, defined earlier by the IEA: a) international content of curricula, b) international movement of students and students concerned with training and research, and c) arrangements engaging U.S. education abroad in technical assistance and educational cooperation programs (Harari, 1972, 3). Here, we may ask a number of questions about the relationship between the strands:

Should there be one single “voice” for internationalization?

Harari noted, as I have outlined earlier, that during the 1960s several key players in the private sector and the public sector attempted to mutually define the goals for international education and establish a “center” or “clearinghouse” for coordination and information. Yet Harari seemed to feel that the “one-voice” model was difficult to achieve, and that even just amongst the academic community, it was a mistake to assume that the group of international education players was ever united in goals, purpose, and function (Ibid). There were always a diverse set of rationales, goals, programs, and
purposes, and attempting to meld these purposes into one clear goal was difficult if not impossible. Still, Harari felt that the academic community and the public sector could continue to work towards defining mutual goals and interdependence.

Scanlon argued somewhat differently that the addition of government-sponsored educational and cultural diplomacy programs (and later government-sponsored aid programs) to the traditional definition of international education created new, perhaps irrevocable problems. He made a distinction between what he called “learning” and what was otherwise “cultural contact” sometimes harnessed into “propaganda.” Navigating what was what and who was who in this complex system was almost impossible (1960; 1968). The distinction also caused the efforts to reform the curriculum into a new set of transnational, interdisciplinary problems to be largely forgotten, an example of a similar disjuncture between theorist and practitioner (1968).

Butts, perhaps the foremost scholar of international education in the time period, began in 1963 with the view that there was a place for a large-scale coordination of international education and development, but questioned that argument in later essays and writings (1969; 1971a; 1971b). In later writings, as Sylvester notes (2005), Butts distinguishes between “genuine” international education (academic programs) and those conducted or coordinated by the government. This distinction would make one single voice for the private-public sector difficult to create or manage.

*Where should education fit in with foreign aid programs?*

Butts was very careful not to confuse foreign educational aid with an “us” and “them” mentality. He argued instead for viewing educational assistance as a process of mutual educational development. But he also later recognized that as long as originating drive for international education programs rested with a national program of foreign aid, international education would be at the hands of national political sensitivities. The growth of foreign aid programs and the general “culture” of foreign aid added to the skepticism from entities both abroad and in the U.S. (1971a; 1971b).

Similarly, Harari found that educational development and assistance programs suffered from a “complex mix of motives and objectives,” both within the “sending” community and the “receiving” community (1972, 22). Some of these programs were rushed via government assistance without proper planning and years of mutual strategic planning (Ibid). The result was sometimes good, but often a number of “unpleasant repercussions and surprises” (Ibid).

While one might argue that a “single voice” or center for educational cooperation would have improved the confusion over motives and objectives, the linking of educational development with the culture of foreign aid provided many obstacles and challenges as well as prospects for success.
Was a more global definition of internationalization missing?

Reviewing the historical development of international education from the vantage point of the late 1960s and 70s, Harari and Butts both pondered whether the euphoria for internationalization was itself too parochial. Harari in particular warned against conceptualizing the field in an “American-village” context, without proper planning with entities abroad (1972). And Butts changed his definition of international education to focus more on the global process of “education as an international force in the modernization process,” not necessarily just focused on the U.S. and its policies (1971a, 33-34). What this shift required was a true academic discipline (or mega-discipline) for international that would be comparative, global, and transnational. Scanlon observed in 1968 that most definitions of international education did not “…do full justice to international education as an evolving academic field for the study of transmitting and fostering beliefs, skills, attitudes, and knowledge across national boundaries.”

In these three areas, then, Butts, Harari, and Scanlon both reviewed and critiqued some of the previous assumptions of internationalization and international education as the area/field/system developed in the post-WWII period.

Mapping the System

We are now able to place theories and rationales for internationalization on a conceptual “map” building upon Sylvester's (2002; 2003; 2005). In his initial matrix, Sylvester identified two major purposes for international education (K-16) in the late 19th and 20th centuries: education for world understanding (the ideal that international education could lead to better international and human relations, peace, and security), and education for world citizenship (the ideal that international education should train students and learners to be effective and productive in an interconnected world). Sylvester was careful to note the multiple overlaps between these two themes. To account for that overlap, he created a matrix that accounted for theories/rationales being “politically sensitive” or “politically neutral.”

With the hope of helping continue the conceptual framework created by Sylvester, I have adopted a similar matrix (Figure 1, below). However, because this essay deals with internationalization in higher education AND government programs, the matrix is slightly modified. The first theme identified is “world peace and understanding; national security; promotion of democracy.” I have noted this theme to be in the interest of the “public good” because it primarily dealt with the benefits of international education for larger society around the globe. The second theme is “global competency development, preparation, and training,” which encompasses “education for world citizenship.” I have noted this theme to comparatively be concerned with the private good, or the benefit of individual students and learners.
Since virtually all of these theories/rationales treat international education as a system of academic and non-academic components, there are virtually none that are “politically neutral.” Instead of using these indicators, I use a number of terms to differentiate between those that were progressive and inclusive of diverse opinions and partners, and those that were conservative, exclusive, and benefited only one partner (by partner I mean a person, agency, organization, institution or country/culture).
Figure 1: Mapping Internationalization in the Post-WWII Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Peace &amp; Understanding; National Security; Promotion of Democracy (Public Good)</th>
<th>Global Competency Development, Preparation, and Training (Private Good)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO (1945)</td>
<td>Fulbright Act (1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith-Mundt Act (1948)</td>
<td>Butts (1969;1971a;b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duggan (1943)</td>
<td>Byrnes and Thompson (1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF (1961)</td>
<td>NDEA (1958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin (1968)</td>
<td>Scanlon (1960, 1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deustch (1952)</td>
<td>Butts (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson/IEA (1965, 1966)</td>
<td>Shank (1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coombs (1965)</td>
<td>Nason (1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulbright-Hays (1961)</td>
<td>Harari (1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankel (1965, 1968)</td>
<td>Wilson (1947a;b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University and World Affairs (1961)</td>
<td>Wilson (1947a;b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunton (1964)</td>
<td>Kandel (1955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenworthy (1947, 1951)</td>
<td>Neal (1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deustch (1963)</td>
<td>Butts (1969;1971a;b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrnes and Thompson (1959)</td>
<td>Scanlon (1960, 1968)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Progressive, Inclusive, Mutually-beneficial, system**
There are a number of alternative ways one could have mapped these theories. For instance, one might more simply make a distinction between the theories that were based in the concepts and methodology of education, and those that were based in government foreign policy and international relations. But that interpretation seems to miss some crucial complexities that overlapped both areas, particularly for Frankel (1965; 1968) and the Johnson speeches (1965; 1966).

Some conclusions and arguments can be drawn from the matrix. The first is to observe simply the tremendous diversity of definitions and interpretations. The second is that international education started to move from a public good to a private good in the post-WWII period, which mirrored or anticipated a similar move in general higher education. Of course, unlike with general higher education, it is difficult to make this argument without dealing with investment and cost. But from a purely theoretical standpoint, the ideas behind internationalization seemed to be shift from a world peace to a competency-focused model focused on individual outcomes.

The third point goes back to the original question of this essay – did internationalization exist in the post-WWII period? It seems clear that in fact some of the most sophisticated arguments and blueprints for internationalization grew out of this era. There are some important distinctions, though. Internationalization here was typically considered a system that overlapped educational goals with international relations/foreign policy goals, and also dealt with educational development abroad. But in the current definitions of internationalization, the focus is more on strategy, curriculum integration and learning goals than on international relations. The internationalization of the 1980s and 90s was one that borrowed heavy from the language and tactics of the business world rather than from the post-WWII era.

There is some evidence that this is changing, and that we are seeing a new era of internationalization that revitalizes some of the Cold War-era conceptions. International education is once again being seen as directly related to international relations and diplomacy. There are clear differences in the time periods, of course. The current discourse is far more centered on economic competition than international development. But there are also numerous similarities.

**Conclusion: Should there be a unification of private and public goals?**

In the beginning of this essay, I first briefly reviewed the major authors who have looked at the history of the international dimension of education and higher education. These authors include Mestenhauser, who has argued that during the post-WWII era, international education became a “mega-goal” that linked educational objectives with foreign policy objectives in a program of full-scale educational and governmental reform.

The mega-goal argument is an intriguing one that deserves much further exploration of motivations and histories. Clearly, there was a movement and partial
unification of goals as seen in the texts identified here. But a “mega-goal” seems to suggest that there was a shared sense of purpose. It remains unclear, for instance, why Frankel did not refer to the work of the Morrill Committee or the work of his predecessor, Coombs, when he outlined his theories. One also wonders if there were too many voices and interests at hand to constitute any kind of majority opinion. Although several goals seem agreed-upon (especially a Center for Educational Cooperation), others were discarded or forgotten. The stories of the International Education Act and Education and World Affairs are ones of misinterpretation and distrust as much as they are stories of partnership. As I hope to explore in the second article on motivations, determining how various “actors” interacted is worth a fuller analysis.

Another contemporary author, Altbach contends that much of what constituted international education in the time period was “neocolonialism.” He would probably argue that all of these theories, for all of their idealism, were de facto involved in the U.S. involvement in the Cold War of “wining hearts and minds” and the ideological fight against communism. It is not the scope of this essay to determine whether that was true or not. What would be needed would be further research into the actual events, policies, and institutional practices that took place in the time period, as well as into the cause-and-effect relationships of the different major players. Some of those relationships will be questioned in the next essay.

However, Altbach’s argument – and the related one of de Wit – seems to be missing some of the vitality and sophistication of internationalization theory of not the on-the-ground reality. Several of these treatises – particularly Frankel’s – argued against an academic system dominated by the U.S. center (with all others on the “periphery”), but rather an international knowledge system that was based on the same notions of equality espoused by theories of human rights and relations. After reviewing the texts here and the development of internationalization in the period, I would argue that communism and the Cold War – and more generally, the beginnings of large-scale globalization – offered scholars and policy makers a chance to develop theories of an international education system that were at a higher level than much of what was produced since.

Today, while immersed in what has been called another “ideological struggle” with such problems as terrorism and global ethnocide, we are still faced with big questions: Should there be a mixing of private and public goals, a “one voice” for international education? Is the “mega-goal” realistic? Do we need a new “Marshall Plan” for the 21st century that would involve the universities, as the president of Cornell recently suggested (2007)? Or should universities go about their business on their own terms, without much help or coordination?

Since the post-WWII era, there have been just a few attempts to recreate anything like the International Education Act, and none to create a Center for Educational
Cooperation. In the early 1990s, the David Boren National Security Act was passed, but it was mostly a rehash of NDEA. In the late 1990s/early 2000s, President Clinton unveiled a much-anticipated resolution on international education, but it held little political weight. More recently, the international education community has rallied behind the Simon/Lincoln Foundation Act that would aim to significantly increase the number of students studying abroad in the next decade. However, these initiatives suffer from being one-sided and un-integrated with the view of internationalization as a system of continual reform. The Simon Act is particularly notable for its language of national security and tone of one-sided, one-dimensional benefit.

The globalization of culture, education, and other forms of social life in the 21st century adds layers of complexity unanticipated by the experts of the post-WWII era. Academic system inequalities seem exacerbated, far from being “laced together” as Frankel had once hoped. Still, there is hope for a future when internationalization is better linked to worldwide international and human development. New institutional internationalization strategies are beginning to see partners abroad as part of mutually-beneficial networks, not simply sites for exchange programs. Higher education and international education are starting to be linked conceptually with civil society and community development programs that are both cross-cultural and transnational. The prospect for success lies in the ability of education to constantly reinvent itself and demonstrate its progress to society at large.

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