NAFSA Advisory: Expanded Online Presence Vetting Policy for F, M, J Visa Applicants

Executive Summary

On June 18, 2025, the Department of State (DOS) instructed consulates worldwide to implement a mandatory expansion of social media vetting for all F, M, and J visa applicants (students and exchange visitors), requiring applicants to make all social media accounts public while consular officers conduct thorough reviews of their entire online presence using search engines and databases to identify "potentially derogatory information" including political activism, terrorism support, anti-Semitic activities, or "hostile attitudes" toward the United States. F, M, and J visa applications will undergo a two-step process involving standard eligibility review followed by enhanced vetting which in many cases may take place under INA 221(g) administrative processing.

The June 18, 2025 DOS cable that delivered the guidance told consulates that they had five business days from the date of the cable to implement the new protocols, after which they could begin opening up new visa appointments (which had been halted since May 27, 2025). The fifth business day following June 18 would be June 26, 2025 (not counting the day the cable was issued and taking into account the intervening weekend and the federal holiday of Juneteenth on June 19). Although visa appointment scheduling is resuming, processing capacity may be reduced due to the resource-intensive nature of the expanded screening requirements. This may translate into longer appointment wait and visa processing times.

The Original "Pause" Cable

On May 27, 2025 the Department of State (DOS) ordered U.S. embassies and consulates to temporarily halt adding additional F, M, and J "visa appointment capacity" until it issued further guidance "in the coming days," on an expansion of social media screening and vetting of student and exchange visitor applicants. See Trump team pauses new student visa interviews as it weighs expanding social media vetting, Politico, May 27, 2025. Politico cited a DOS cable that reportedly stated:

"Effective immediately, in preparation for an expansion of required social media screening and vetting, consular sections should not add any additional student or exchange visitor (F, M, and J) visa appointment capacity until further guidance is issued septel, which we anticipate in the coming days."

"SEPTEL" is DOS shorthand for "separate telegram," which means that DOS said it would send the actual guidance on expansion of social media vetting to consulates and embassies via a separate cable "in the coming days."

The New Guidance Cable

On June 18, 2025 the Department of State announced that it finally issued the expected "new guidance" on social media vetting, and that consulates will resume scheduling F, M, and J nonimmigrant visa appointments "soon." See Announcement of Expanded Screening and Vetting for Visa Applicant, U.S. Department of State press release, June 18, 2025.

Earlier that same day, media outlets had begun reporting that they'd obtained a copy of the cable sent to consular offices containing the anticipated new directives on how consular officers should screen the social media and online presence of applicants applying for F, M, and J visas, and factors the consulates should consider as they resume scheduling student visa interviews. See, for example:

• State Department unveils social media screening rules for all student visa applicants, Politico, June 18, 2025
• Student Visa Applicants with ‘Hostile Attitudes’ Will Be Told They Can’t Come to the U.S., The Free Press, June 18, 2025
• State Dept. restarts student visa interviews with tougher social media rules, The Washington Post, June 18, 2025
• Trump administration restarting student visa appointments, State Dept official says, Reuters, June 18, 2025

On June 20, 2025, a document purporting to be the cable began circulating in the immigration bar. See NAFSA's transcription of the purported cable.

The media reports and the circulated cable together give a more detailed understanding of the new consular policy and procedures, and form the basis of this NAFSA resource. Remember, though, that this is still based on non-public documents, and that DOS may adjust or revise its policies at any time.

Resumption of appointment scheduling

The DOS website announcement stated that:

"Our overseas posts will resume scheduling F, M, and J nonimmigrant visa applications soon. Applicants should check the relevant embassy or consulate website for appointment availability." 

Five business day timeline for implementation. The document purporting to be the DOS cable that circulated in the media and the immigration bar tells consulates to implement the new vetting procedures "within five business days" and to "resume regular scheduling of FMJ visa applications once these actions requests are implemented." The fifth business day following June 18 would be June 26, 2025 (not counting the day the cable was issued, the intervening weekend, or the federal holiday of Juneteenth on June 19). 

Impact of new vetting on FMJ scheduling capacity. Although the cable tells consulates that they may "resume regular scheduling of FMJ visa applications once these actions requests are implemented," processing capacity may be reduced due to the resource-intensive nature of the expanded screening requirements. This may translate into longer appointment wait and visa processing times. The DOS cable notes that posts should:

• "consider the effect of this guidance on workload and schedule accordingly" and
• "consider overall scheduling volume and the resource demands of appropriate vetting; posts might need to schedule fewer FMJ cases than they did previously"

Despite the authorization by the Department of State to reestablish FMJ appointments, a consular mission's ability to offer appointments will depend on both local conditions and available staffing resources. For example, the U.S. embassy websites of both mission Japan and India have posted this message (last checked July 15, 2025): "We are committed to processing all existing appointment with our available resources.... We cannot guarantee that students or exchange visitor visa applicants without an existing appointment will be able to schedule an interview this summer." We have not seen any other embassy with messaging like this, however. Visa applicants should continue to check the U.S. embassy's appointment system to try to secure an appointment.

Expedited appointment priorities for J physicians and F-1 students coming to schools with 15% or less international student enrollment. The cable says that posts can resume "FMJ expedited appointment requests," but that they should prioritize making expedited appointments available to:

• "J-1 physicians
• F-1 students seeking to study at a U.S. university where international students constitute 15 percent or less of the total student population, according to the U.S. Department of Education."

No production or processing quotas or targets. The DOS cable tells consular managers that they must "not maintain or establish any formal or informal production or processing quotas or targets for consular officers or those involved in administrative processing of visa cases. Rather consular officers shall take the time necessary to satisfy themselves that visa applicants qualify for the visas they seek, and personnel involved in back-office processing shall take the time necessary to perform their tasks thoroughly."

Overall Process

Applies to new and returning FMJ visa applicants. The cable makes clear that the guidance in the cable "covers all FMJ applicants, new or returning."

The cable instructs consular officers to take these steps:

Step 1 - Conduct Standard Intake and Interview with Initial Eligibility, INA 214(b), and INA 212(a) Determinations

Consular officers are instructed to first conduct standard intake and interviews to determine whether the FMJ applicant "is otherwise eligible for the requested nonimmigrant status." The visa will be refused under 214(b) or 214(a) without further vetting if the consular officer determines applicant is ineligible under regular standards.

This is the pre-existing standard process that involves a consular officer examining the applicant's visa application (Form DS-160), supporting evidence, and information gathered during the visa interview through the lens of INA 214(b), the Immigration and Nationality Act provision that presumes that all nonimmigrant visa applicants have "immigrant" intent until they establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer that they are entitled to a nonimmigrant classification under INA 101(a)(15) (i.e., under INA 101(a)(15)(F) for F-1 student status, INA 101(a)(15)(M) for M-1 student status, or INA 101(a)(15)(J) for J-1 exchange visitor status).

As a reminder and example, INA 101(a)(15)(F) [8 USC 1101(a)(15)(F)] describes an F-1 student as:

The standard review also examines whether the applicant is inadmissible under any of the grounds of inadmissibility set forth at INA 212(a) [8 USC 1182(a)].

If during this initial review the consular officer is not satisfied that the applicant is eligible for the visa category, he or she will refuse the visa under one or more of these grounds.

Step 2 - Conduct Expanded Vetting if Applicant Found Otherwise Eligible

If the consular officer initially finds that the applicant is otherwise eligible for the requested visa, the officer must then conduct the expanded vetting specified by the cable, before issuing the visa.

INA 221(g) refusal/administrative processing mechanism

INA 221(g) refusal. The DOS cable instructs consular officers that they should conduct "intake and interviews in accordance with standard procedures" and then, once they "determine an FMJ applicant is otherwise eligible for the requested nonimmigrant status," they must must:

• "[R]efuse the case under INA 221(g)"
• "Inform the applicant that his case is refused and requires additional administrative processing to establish his eligibility for the visa"
• "Request that the applicant set all of his social media accounts to 'public' and"
• "[R]emind the applicant that limited access to, or visibility of, online presence could be construed as an effort to evade or hide certain activity"

The interviewing consular officer will then conduct the enhanced vetting required by the DOS cable.

Currently pending cases and cases eligible for a visa interview waiver must also still be vetted. The DOS cable clarifies that:

"For FMJ cases currently in "open" status that have not yet been interviewed or, in the case of interview waiver cases, otherwise adjudicated, posts should request that applicants make their social media accounts "public," then conduct the vetting described in this cable. If no potentially derogatory information is found, post can adjudicate the case to completion. If potentially derogatory information is found, post should refuse the case under the appropriate refusal code; or, if needed, post should call the applicant back for a follow-up interview."

and

"For FMJ cases that were interviewed before the release of ref C and are otherwise approvable but currently in INA 221(g) status, posts should request that applicants make their social media accounts "public," then conduct the vetting described in this cable. If no potentially derogatory information is found, post can adjudicate the case to completion. If potentially derogatory information is found, post should refuse the case under the appropriate refusal code; or, if needed, post should call the applicant back for a follow-up interview."

Although currently pending and visa interview waiver-eligible cases must still undergo the expanded vetting, it is still unclear from the language of the cable whether these cases would also be refused under INA 221(g) during the vetting.

"Refused" and "Issued" in the CEAC. Since a refusal on the basis of INA 221(g) is a real refusal, the application will likely appear as "Refused" in the applicant's CEAC (Consular Electronic Application Center) record. Once vetting is completed, if no "potentially derogatory information" is found, or is resolved, the consular officer can reactivate the case and approve the visa, in which case the CEAC record should reflect "Issued." See DOS policy described at 9 FAM 403.10-4(A)(b) for information on consular reactivation of cases refused under INA 221(g).

The enhanced vetting

"Caseworker approach"

The same consular officer who interviews the applicant will also perform the vetting. The DOS cable describes this as a "caseworker" approach "that allows a single decisionmaker to consider the whole applicant and the totality of facts surrounding the application," and asserts that this approach "permits better detection of potentially derogatory information and inconsistencies."

The DOS cable tells consular officers that "must document the results of your vetting in detailed case notes, including all potentially derogatory information and inconsistencies. If you find any relevant information online, take screenshots to preserve the record against possible later alteration or loss of the information and upload those screenshots to the applicant's case record in the CCD."

Note: The CCD is the Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs' Consular Consolidated Database. For background on the CCD, see the Department of State's latest (11/2022) Privacy Impact Assessement of the CCD.

General scope of vetting

Comprehensive vetting, not just social media. The DOS cable tells consular officers to "conduct a comprehensive and thorough vetting of each FMJ applicant who is otherwise issuable (i.e. overcomes 214(b)). Vetting means examining all aspects of the case, including the application, supporting evidence, and information you gather during the interview. You should review these in light of your personal knowledge, your expertise, and all sources of information available to you. It should include a review of the applicant's entire online presence -- not just social media activity -- using any appropriate search engines or other online resources. It also should include a check of any databases to which the consular section has access (e.g., LexisNexis or local equivalents)."

In its section titled "What am I looking for?," the DOS cable tells consular officers: "During the vetting, you simply are looking for any potentially derogatory information about the applicant."

The DOS website announcement states that:

"We use all available information in our visa screening and vetting to identify visa applicants who are inadmissible to the United States, including those who pose a threat to U.S. national security.  Under new guidance, we will conduct a comprehensive and thorough vetting, including online presence, of all student and exchange visitor applicants in the F, M, and J nonimmigrant classifications. To facilitate this vetting, all applicants for F, M, and J nonimmigrant visas will be instructed to adjust the privacy settings on all of their social media profiles to “public.”

Social media and online presence review as key part of overall vetting

A detailed examination of the applicant's online presence is part of the overall "comprehensive and thorough vetting of all FMJ applicants" called for by the DOS cable. It clarifies that this "a review of the applicant's entire online presence -- not just social media activity -- using any appropriate search engines or other online resources. It also should include a check of any databases to which the consular section has access (e.g., LexisNexis or local equivalents)."

Making social media accounts "public." As mentioned earlier, the DOS cable instructs consular officers to "Request that the applicant set all of his social media accounts to "public" and remind the applicant that limited access to, or visibility of, online presence could be construed as an effort to evade or hide certain activity." The cable also 

Many embassies and consulates have already posted notices on their websites like this one on the U.S. Embassy & Consulates in France website:

"Effective immediately, all individuals applying for an F, M, or J nonimmigrant visa are requested to adjust the privacy settings on all of their social media accounts to ‘public’ to facilitate vetting necessary to establish their identity and admissibility to the United States under U.S. law."

On June 25, 2025, the DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs posted this entry on X:

"Every visa adjudication is a national security decision. All individuals applying for an F, M, or J nonimmigrant visa are requested to adjust the privacy settings on all of their social media accounts to ‘public’ to facilitate vetting necessary to establish their identity and admissibility to the United States under U.S. law.

Since 2019, the United States has required visa applicants to provide social media identifiers on immigrant and nonimmigrant visa application forms. We use all available information in our visa screening and vetting to identify visa applicants who are inadmissible to the United States, including those who pose a threat to U.S. national security."

The DOS cable directs consular staff that "[i]f it is necessary to sign in to an account to view all of an applicant's activity on a particular social media platform (e.g., Instagram), you must do so using an official account that is publicly attributable to the Department. Consular sections may create such accounts in accordance with the platform's Terms of Service. Do not use accounts that are used for public communication."

Consequences of not making social media accounts public. If a consular officer is unable to review "any aspect of an applicant's online presence because social media accounts are set to 'private' or otherwise limited, you should treat the case as any other where an applicant fails to provide certain information on request. You must consider whether such failure reflects evasiveness or otherwise calls into question the applicant's credibility."

Other resources a consular officer can use to accomplish the vetting

The DOS cable tells consular officers that "Other consular staff may perform discrete portions of the vetting that cannot be performed by the interviewing officer." This might include:

• Locally employed (LE) staff. The cable tells consular officer that they may consult locally employed staff (LE staff) "to understand the social media environment at post and which search engines and techniques are best for comprehensively exploring an applicant's online presence. LE staff can help provide context, including when assessing the credibility of applicants who apparently lack any online presence or who did not provide social media identifiers."
• The consulates Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU). The DOS cable makes clear that "vetting is not a fraud assessment," and that officer should not refer a case to the post's FPU "for vetting or for any portion of the vetting." The cable notes, though, that ""if only FPU staff have access to LexisNexis, FPU staff may conduct that check and return the results to the interviewing consular officer." Although a post FPU has a limited role in the vetting itself, the cable does say that "you might discover information during vetting that leads to an FPU referral."

Step 3 - Consideration of the results of the vetting

As stated previously, the DOS cable also tells consular officers conducting the vetting that they "simply are looking for any potentially derogatory information about the applicant... to ensure it does not indicate an ineligibility under INA 212(a) or 214(b). For example, during an online presence search, you might discover in local media that an applicant had been arrested and charged with a serious crime, a possible 2A1 ineligibility, that he did not disclose on his application. In such a case, you could request additional information from the applicant to help you determine whether he is ineligible."

Inconsistencies between vetting results and how applicant presented. The DOS cable tells consular officers to "be alert to any inconsistencies between what you discover during vetting and how the applicant presented himself in his application, in his supporting evidence, or during the interview. You must explore all such inconsistencies to ensure they do not indicate visa ineligibilities. Even when such inconsistencies do not point to an INA 212(a) ineligibility, they can call into question the applicant's credibility."

Activity that may indicate an INA 214(b) inadmissibility. If the consular officer believes that results of the vetting indicate that, contrary to the consular officer's initial determination that the applicant overcame INA 214(b), there is information uncovered that would undermine the applicant's credibility or otherwise cause the consular officer to reconsider the initial determination. The DOS cable gives these examples:

Political activism. "... for applicants who demonstrate a history of political activism, especially when it is associated with violence or with the views and activities described above, you must consider the likelihood they would continue such activity in the United States and, if so, whether such activity is consistent with the nonimmigrant visa classification they seek. As Secretary Rubio has said, we do not seek to import activists who will disrupt and undermine scholarly activity at U.S. universities."

Unlawful employment or other indications of engaging in administration-proscribed behavior. "Even if inconsistencies or potentially derogatory information you uncover during vetting do not rise to the level of an INA 212(a) ineligibility, you must consider whether they undermine the applicant's credibility or suggest that the applicant will not respect the terms of his admission to the United States. For example, while vetting applicants, many posts have discovered evidence online that those applicants had worked illegally while in the United States previously, thus seriously undermining their credibility in subsequent visa applications."

Activity that may indicate an INA 212(a)(3) inadmissibility. The consular officer will consider and weigh the results of the vetting. If the officer uncovers "potentially derogatory information" that could lead to an INA 212(a)(3) ineligibility (security and related grounds) that was not detected during the initial review, the officer must request a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), which could delay resolution of the vetting. The cable specifically mentions these INA 212(a)(3) inadmissibility grounds, but does not limit it to them:

• "INA 212(a)(3)(A)(ii), where an applicant is traveling solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in any unlawful activity (9 FAM 302.5-4).
• INA 212(a)(3)(A)(iii), where an applicant seeks to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in any activity, a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the U.S. government by force, violence, or other unlawful means (9 FAM 302.5-5).
• INA 212(a)(3)(B), where an applicant engages in certain terrorist activities, including espousing such activities, or has provided any form of material support to a terrorist organization (9 FAM 302.6)."

The DOS cable gives this example of a possible INA 212(a)(3) issue: "For example, during an online presence search, you might discover on social media that an applicant endorsed Hamas or its activities, a possible 3B ineligibility, that he did not disclose on this application."

Activity leading to an INA 212(a)(3)(C) inquiry and determination of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." INA 212(a)(3)(C)/8 USC 1182(a)(3)(C) authorizes the Secretary of State to exclude an individual "whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary... has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States." The DOS cable tells consular officers to " pursue a finding that the applicant is ineligible under INA 212(a)(3)(C)" in any case where an applicant:

• "expresses hostile attitudes toward the citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles of the United States;
• OR advocates for, aids, or supports designated foreign terrorists and other threats to U.S. national security;
• OR expresses support for or perpetrates unlawful anti-Semitic harassment or violence;
• AND overcomes INA 214(b);
• AND is not ineligible under any other provision of INA 212(a)(3)"

Like the SAO process, the officer's pursuing an INA 212(a)(3)(C) determination from the Secretary of State would add time to the resolution of the vetting.

Since a refusal on the basis of INA 221(g) is a real refusal, the application will in all likelihood appear as "Refused" in the applicant's CEAC (Consular Electronic Application Center) record during the vetting process. Once vetting is completed, if no "potentially derogatory information" is found, or is resolved, the consular officer can reactivate the case and approve the visa, in which case the CEAC record should reflect "Issued." See DOS policy described at 9 FAM 403.10-4(A)(b) for information on consular reactivation of cases refused under INA 221(g).

Advocacy and engagement on the issue

Advocacy

• On June 11, 2025, in collaboration with the U.S. for Success Coalition, NAFSA launched an advocacy campaign urging Congress to press the State Department to resume visa appointments immediately. See NAFSA's Visa Interview Suspension Advocacy page.
• On May 30, 2025 NAFSA joined a letter led by the American Council on Education to the Department of State Secretary Marco Rubio expressing deep concern about the pause in student visa interviews and plans to revoke the visas for some Chinese students.

Engagement

• Tell NAFSA About the Impact the Visa Appointment Suspension is Having on Your Institution. Complete a survey accessible through NAFSA IssueNet to help NAFSA gather information on how the suspension in new student/exchange visitor visa appointment availability and its aftermath is affecting international enrollment, planning, and operations. You will be asked to provide estimated numbers of visa documents issued, enrollment, etc. Submissions are anonymous. NAFSA will not share specific details gathered but will use the information collected to describe broadly what is occurring and identify patterns and trends. Please designate one individual from your institution to report cases to avoid duplicate reporting.

Caveats. Although every attempt has been made to ensure that the information contained in this resource is accurate has been obtained from reliable sources, NAFSA and the publishers disclaim any and all liability resulting from reliance upon this information, or from any errors contained herein. This information is for educational purposes only. This information does not substitute for the direct reading of applicable laws and government guidance, nor does it constitute legal advice, which can only be obtained from licensed attorneys. Individuals in need of legal advice or who wish to discuss legal strategies should contact an experienced immigration lawyer.